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INTRODUCTION
The New Deal may not have been the start of the modem administrative state,
but it is often flagged as the historic anchor of administrative governance.'
Stylized as it is, that governance system is characterized by expert agencies that
Congress empowers, the President superintends (to one degree or another), and
courts police.2 Central to this model is a power struggle between the President
and Congress.3 Congress enables agencies that it expects are bound by clear statu-
tory criteria and are independent from partisan or particular political whims.4 The
President, on the other hand, expects to direct agency action and control the pol-
icy machinery of her administration.' Congress and presidents have always
engaged in this tug of war,6 so the courts have become arbiters of bureaucratic fi-
delity to either Congress or the President. During the New Deal period, the
Supreme Court was skeptical of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's aggressive
regulatory agenda and, in consequence, tended to limit presidential power.'
Today, focusing on the President's unique capacity to represent "the people," the
Court is hesitant to circumscribe presidential control over administrators.'
1. See, e.g., BLAKE EMERSON, THE PUBLIC'S LAW: ORIGINS AND ARCHITECTURE OF PROGRESSIVE
DEMOCRACY 127 (2019); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 13 (2012); JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED
ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: How ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT 8-9 (2018) [hereinafter MASHAw, REASONED ADMINISTRATION]; K. SABEEL RAHMAN,
DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 35 (2017); Patrick M. Corrigan & Richard L. Revesz, The Genesis
ofIndependent Agencies, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 639 & n.4, 671 (2017); Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword:
1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (2017); Cass R.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 422 n.1 (1987).
2. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 1137, 1141-44 (2014); see generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938)
(laying out the classic justification of the administrative state).
3. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 426.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (cataloguing presidential exertions of
authority over the administrative bureaucracy).
7. See, e.g., Humphrey's Exec. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935) (deciding "[w]hether
the power of the President ... shall prevail over the authority of Congress" and holding in favor of
Congress).
8. A long line of cases increases presidential control by broadly interpreting the phrase: "Officers of
the United States" in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, thereby demanding more presidential input
in the selection of government officials, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051, 2055 (2018); Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118, 140-41 (1976) (per
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Now imagine if the New Deal were the origin of a different administrative
experiment and trajectory. Imagine if Congress, the President, and the industries
they hoped to regulate all decided that neither politically isolated bureaucrats nor
a popularly sanctioned President should wield the power to administer the laws,
to make legislative-type policy, to enforce that policy, or to adjudicate disputes
under it. Imagine if there were another experiment-one that has persisted, but
that few have noticed.
Imagine no longer. Among its many novelties, the New Deal marked the be-
ginning of an ambitious program of agricultural regulation,9 and the newly
empowered United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) needed a way
to administer the program. Eventually, the USDA settled on something new,
radical, untested, and totally foreign to administrative governance: elected
administrators. 10
Rather than claim legitimacy from insulated expertise, congressional authori-
zation, or presidential direction, elected administrators unchain themselves from
these traditional sources and seek legitimacy directly from voters. Putting aside,
for a moment, the question of the constitutional propriety of this system of direct
administrative democracy," elected bureaucracy is a noteworthy New Deal
experiment that the world of administrative law has forgotten. The struggle
between Congress and the President looms large today, yet the l gal literature has
mostly ignored administrative democracy.12 In fact, legal scholars seem wholly
curiam), and by creating a removal doctrine that centers around presidential authority, Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010); Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 117 (1926).
9. JESS GLBERT, PLANNING DEMOCRACY: AGRARIAN INTELLECTUALS AND THE INTENDED NEw DEAL
80 (2015); see, e.g., Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat. 246;
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 74-461, 49 Stat. 1148 (1936); Agricultural
Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-10,48 Stat. 31 (1933).
10. See Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-354, § 227, 108 Stat. 3178, 3216-18 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C. and 16 U.S.C.); see Reed L. Frischknecht, The Democratization of Administration: The Farmer
Committee System, 47 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 704, 704 (1953).
11. In a companion article, I discuss in detail the constitutional questions of electoral
administration and what the answers to those questions can tell us about administrative law more
broadly. See Galperin, supra note *. In brief, the companion article argues that elected committees are
unconstitutional because they do not meet either constitutional requirements for appointment or the
Supreme Court's expectations-articulated primarily in constitutional removal doctrine-for
presidential control over administrators. Id. (manuscript at 4-5). The committees are "Officers of the
United States" but they are "appointed" through elections, which is not a constitutionally sound method.
Id. (manuscript at 40). The committees are likewise cut off from presidential control or control by
presidential appointees because their tenure is determined by electors, not by the President or
presidential appointees. Id. (manuscript at 42).
12. There are only two works that discuss the elected farmer committees in any detail. See generally
Cassandra Jones Havard, African-American Farmers and Fair Lending: Racializing Rural Economic
Space, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 333 (2001); Note, The Federal Agricultural Stabilization Program
and the Negro, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1121 (1967) [hereinafter Agricultural Stabilization and the Negro].
Both pieces focus on the disgraceful racism of the elected committees but pass over their larger history,
operations, and impacts on our understanding of administrative law. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
These writings represent he extent of study within the legal literature. Agricultural historians and farm-
policy scholars have been somewhat more attentive. See infra notes 204-15 and accompanying text.
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unaware that there is such a thing as administrative democracy. Leaders in the
field such as Professors Jerry L. Mashaw, Lisa Schultz Bressman, Steven G.
Calabresi, Cass R. Sunstein, and then-Professor Elena Kagan have written exten-
sively, carefully, and thoughtfully about administrative legitimacy, remarking
specifically on what they imagine is a consistent feature of bureaucracy-that
bureaucrats are unelected and therefore unaccountable.13 Professor Richard B.
Stewart once even wrote that electing administrators could be a solution to the
bureaucratic accountability deficit, but he dismissed the idea as a "radical depar-
ture from established principles and practices," having failed to discover the
elected administrators already within the USDA. 14
Judges, for the most part, are equally unaware that at present the United States
is home to elected administrators. In 2010, for a majority of the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that "people do not vote for the 'Officers of the
United States."' In June 2019, Justice Neil Gorsuch dissented with two other
Justices in Gundy v. United States, arguing that administrative policymaking, in
its entirety, is questionable because bureaucrats re not directly accountable to
voters.16 Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Byron White, Judge Patricia Wald, and
others have repeated the misperception that all administrators are unelected.1 7
And yet, electoral administration does exist.
Today, the USDA's elected farmer committee system is made up of over 7,700
elected farmers sitting on over 2,200 county committees.8 The elected farmer
committees are charged with real administration and implementation of federal
law, not mere advice-giving. They make and enforce policy and adjudicate dis-
putes that impact the rights and obligations of people outside the government.
And they are elected. As such, they represent he most important, and apparently
the only, example of genuine electoral administration. This Article will explore
the elected farmer committees in detail and provide the first and only complete
look at the committees in the legal literature.1 9 One of the important conclusions
that this Article will reach is that although these elected farmer committees fly a
13. See MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1 at 5; Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462
(2003); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23,
81-82 (1995); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331 (2001);
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 505.
14. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1800-02 (1975). It is, of course, understandable that scholars have not taken much note of elected
administrators given that the elected farmer committees example in this Article is likely the only such
example in the federal system.
15. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497-98 (2010).
16. See 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131, 2134-35 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 305 (2013); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968
(1983) (White, J., dissenting); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,400 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
18. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, 2019 COUNTY COMMITTEE ELECTIONS 2 (2019),
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/NewsRoom/County-Committee-Elections/
pdf/2019%20County%20Committee%20Elections.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM4T-RR88].
19. For two articles that have meaningfully addressed discrete aspects of the elected committees, see
supra note 12.
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banner of "administrative democracy," meaning they purport to administer laws
based on direct democratic engagement, their democratic bona fides are question-
able and they are better termed, at best, "electoral administration" because major-
itarian elections are their closest connection to a meaningful understanding of
"democracy."
There are several examples of schemes that superficially look like electoral admin-
istration, but upon closer scrutiny are not. The Federal Home Loan Bank program
elects bank directors,20 but these directors, and the banks themselves, serve a private-
governance function more than a public-administration one.21 The Department of
Housing and Urban Development provides for public housing "resident councils,"
which are elected2 2 but perform a distinctly advisory, rather than administrative, func-
23tion. The Department of Labor relies on input from elected state employees to plan
for its regular employment-statistics assessment.24 But it is also their purpose too to
provide advice to the federal government.25 Within the USDA, grazing advisory
board members are elected from among ranchers operating on federal lands.26 As the
name suggests, they provide advice, not administration.2 7 All of these examples fea-
ture genuine elections, but these elections populate advice-giving panels, not regula-
tory or adjudicatory administrative bodies.
Another example, distinct from the first four in an important way, is the USDA
commodity committees. (Reread that: I am speaking here of commodity commit-
tees, not county committees. The latter are the focus of this Article. The former are
important now as a counterpoint.) The commodity committees are self-organized
but federally sanctioned cartels that regulate the production and marketing of cer-
tain agriculture products.28 Their role here is genuine administrative regulation
20. 12 C.F.R. § 1261.3(c) (2019).
21. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of Seattle v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1283,
1289 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (finding that the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle was not a "government
agency" for the purposes of section 1345 jurisdiction); OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL (2019), https://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov/Agency.aspx?Entityld=
Kg73y4l/18E=&ParentEld=+klubNxgVOo=&EType=jY3M4CTKVHY= [https://perma.cc/DC2P-DF6R]
(last visited Feb. 10, 2020) (describing the main activity of Federal Home Loan Banks as providing
"funding for financial institutions and the U.S. mortgage markets"); see generally Federal Home Loan
Bank Boards of Directors: Eligibility and Elections, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,710 (Sept. 26, 2008) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1261) (regulating the eligibility and election of individuals to serve on the boards of directors of
the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks).
22. 24 C.F.R. § 964.130 (2019).
23. Id. § 964.135(b); Resident Councils: A Voice for Public Housing Tenants, RESIDENT
NEWSLETTER (U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Wash., D.C.), Dec. 2011, at 2, https://www.hud.gov/
sites/documents/RESIDENTDEC2011 .PDF [https://perma.cc/KL2R-HKDB].
24. See 29 C.F.R. § 44.2 (2019). But see Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No.
113-128, § 308(e), 128 Stat. 1425, 1629-30 (2014) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 491-2 (2012))
(eliminating the statutory requirement for elections).
25. See 29 C.F.R. § 44.1 (2019).
26. 36C.F.R. §222.11(b)-(c) (2019).
27. 16 U.S.C. §580k(b) (2012); 36 C.F.R. §222.11(e).
28. 7 U.S.C. § 608b (2012); Marketing Orders & Agreements, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. MKTG.
SERV., https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/moa [https://perma.cc/V7HY-5KAQ] (last visited
Feb. 10, 2020).
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with real legal consequences. And there are administrative elections. Sort of.
Farmers who produce would-be regulated commodities must vote to establish the
cartels and then vote again for membership on the commodity committees.2 9 But
the elections in this scheme are not the formal mode of membership appointment.
The elections are a way of collecting names, which are then presented to the
Secretary of Agriculture who makes the formal, legally requisite appointment.30
This is electorally informed administration, but it is not electoral administration.
The county committees (yes, now we are talking again about county commit-
tees and not commodity committees) have real elections. They are not merely
appointed after some prefatory electoral pretense, and they have a variety of real
administrative powers that extend to adjudicating disputes and setting binding
policy. Former Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, however, seems to think,
or at least has promoted the misconception, that farmer committees are not much
more than advisors. In a 2014 press release, then-Secretary Vilsack praised the
committees, saying, "Through the county committees, farmers and ranchers
have a voice; their opinions and ideas get o be heard on federal farm pro-
grams."31 The Farm Service Agency describes the committees as "a direct link
between the farm community and the U.S. Department of Agriculture." 32 This
message that farmer committees are opportunities to "be heard," in other words,
to advise and share opinions with the USDA, seems to have made its way to farm-
ers as well. Among some farmers and farm advocates there is a sense that the
committees are powerless.33 They are not, as this Article explains.
Perhaps most have overlooked electoral administration as a concept because so
much comes close, but fails to cross the threshold of meaningful electoral admin-
istration. Or perhaps most have overlooked electoral administration because the
role of the elected farmers is buried in rhetoric of mere advice-giving. In either
case, this Article should help uncover an important example of administrative
participation and untangle some of the confusion.
The first Part will describe the general administrative structure of the county
committees. Part II will describe the history, authority, and responsibility of the
committees over time. Part III will try to understand the committees better by
29. § 608c(8), (19).
30. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 905.23(a) (2019) (establishing that he Secretary "shall" select members
from the list of elected nominees "or from other qualified persons" for the commodity committee of
certain Florida farmers); id. § 906.22 (establishing that the Secretary "shall" select members of the
commodity committee for certain Texas farmers); see also id. § 906.23 ("The Secretary may select the
members of the committee and alternates from nominations which may be made in the following
manner. . .. ").
31. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Service Agency County Committee Nomination Period
Begins June 15 (June 6, 2014), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/news-room/news-releases/2014/nr_20140606_
rel_0101 [https://perna.cc/XLP8-7E27].
32. County Committee Elections, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, https://www.fsa.usda.
gov/news-room/county-committee-elections/index [https://perna.cc/4DBW-2GWB] (last visited Feb.
12, 2020).
33. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Cara Fraver, Bus. Servs. Dir., Nat'l Young Farmers Coal.
(Mar. 11, 2019).
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looking at several competing philosophical and ideological justifications for their
existence. The penultimate Part IV describes the modem trajectory of the com-
mittees and argues that there has been a (perhaps inevitable and expected) failure
to meet the aspirations of administrative democracy and that the committees, as
structured, are unconstitutional. The Article's final Part V concludes by briefly
pondering some of the lessons of electoral administration.
I. STRUCTURE
Before delving into the history and powers of the elected county committees, it
is helpful to have an overview of the committee structures, of the electoral pro-
cess, and of the committees' place within the larger USDA infrastructure.
From the beginning, the basic purpose of the elected farmer committees was to
help implement the vast array of new federal farm programs.3 4 Today, Congress
explicitly permits the Secretary of Agriculture to use the committees to help carry
out any program over which the Secretary has authority.35 The exact nature of
this help has changed over time and is discussed more in the following sections.
The structure of these committees has also changed since their inception over
seventy years ago, but today a detailed statutory regime provides a clear
framework.
The elected county committees are housed within the USDA's Farm Service
Agency (FSA).3 6 The FSA is a huge component of the USDA, with responsibility
for "Farm Programs, Farm Loans, Commodity Operations, Management and
State Operations."37 This list covers farm safety-net programs, credit programs,
and environmental-conservation programs, among others. Under the FSA um-
brella is the work of the FSA Deputy Administrator for Field Operations.3 8 This
Deputy Administrator is charged with overseeing a large system of local USDA
programs.3 9 These local programs include state-level committees across the coun-
try.40 The state committees are appointed by the Secretary-the traditional top-
down administrative process.41 Beneath the state committees are the elected
county committees.
Congress has directed the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a committee in
each jurisdiction where the USDA provides farm-support programs.42 Although
these jurisdictions typically overlap with county boundaries, and I therefore use
34. Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-10, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 31, 37 (1933).
35. 16 U.S.C § 590h(b)(5)(B)(i)(I) (2012).
36. 7 C.F.R. § 7.1(a) (2019).
37. Agency History, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, https://www.fsa.usda.gov/about-
fsa/history-and-mission/agency-history/index [https://perma.cc/K6AR-3WH5] (last visited Feb. 12,
2020).
38. Deputy Administrator for Field Operations, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, https://
www.fsa.usda.gov/about-fsa/fsa-biographies/deputy-administrator-for-field-operations/index [https://
perma.cc/C3P8-LAM9] (last visited Feb. 12, 2020).
39. Id.
40. 7 C.F.R. § 7.1(a), (g).
41. See 16 U.S.C § 590h(b)(5)(A) (2012).
42. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(i)(I).
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the term "county committees" throughout this Article, the Secretary may also es-
tablish "area committees."43 Area committees are committees that follow the
boundaries of more than one county or carve out a smaller jurisdiction within a
county.44 In either case, the committees are widely distributed and locally ori-
ented, but are nevertheless federal agencies.
Once the Secretary has established a committee, it is populated with three to
five members.45 "To be eligible for nomination and election ... an agricultural
producer shall be located within the area under the jurisdiction of a . . . commit-
tee, and participate or cooperate in programs administered within that area."46
Committee members are thus farmers within the committee's geographic boun-
daries who are engaged with the USDA farm programs.
Members are "elected by the agricultural producers that participate or cooper-
ate in programs administered within the area under the jurisdiction of the ...
committee."47 In other words, these are committees made up of farmers who are
elected to their position by other farmers within the same jurisdiction. As with eli-
gibility for membership on the committee, only those farmers who are involved
in the USDA programs are eligible to vote.48
Elected members erve three-year terms on a county committee.4 9 By regula-
tion, USDA further imposes a limit of nine consecutive years, or three consecu-
tive terms.0 Committee members may serve three consecutive terms or forgo
committee service for at least one year and then serve for another nine years
before the regulatory limit kicks in again." Beyond the three-year term and the
three-term limit, it is doubtful that elected committee members can be removed,
other than through the electoral process.5 2 The regulations provide a for-cause re-
moval provision, asserting that officials within USDA can remove elected com-
mittee members for certain limited reasons through a specified removal process.53
This purported authority conflicts with the statutory scheme, which does not pro-
vide for removal and authorizes USDA to make regulations, but only regulations
43. See id.
44. See § 590h(b)(5)(B)(i)(II).
45. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(ii)(I). When a committee covers a jurisdiction wider than a single county, the
committee may be made up of as many as eleven members. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(ii)(II).
46. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(III)(aa).
47. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(ii)(I)(bb).
48. Although outside this scope of this Article, this limited electorate raises a constitutional question
because the Supreme Court has held that restricting the voting franchise, even in the context of an
administrative matter, can violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No.
15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iv).
50. 7 C.F.R. § 7.18(10) (2019).
5 1. Id.
52. See Galperin, supra note * (manuscript at 27-29).
53. 7 C.F.R. § 7.28 (2019).
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addressing the selection (not removal) of committee members and the exercise of
their programmatic authority.54
Although USDA personnel have no authority over the selection or removal of
most committee members, they have substantial control over committee opera-
tions. At the highest level, the Secretary has complete discretion to use the com-
mittees for essentially any purpose." Below the secretarial level, the county
committees are "subject to the general direction and supervision of the State com-
mittee,"5 6 the FSA Administrator,57 and the Deputy Administrator for Field
Operations." Each of these supervisory authorities has the power to direct or cor-
rect action of the county committees.59 Moreover, although the elected commit-
tees have diverse authority (described further in the next section) their decisions
are appealable to the state committee, or to the USDA's centralized National
Appeals Division.60
The statutory and regulatory structure, the electoral process, and their role
within the USDA are prerequisites for understanding the surprising existence of
these elected federal administrators. But o fully understand their existence and
the lessons they might teach, it is important to also trace their origins, the ebb and
flow of their powers, and the complex ideologies that have kept them alive.
II. HISTORY & POWER
This Part explores the history of the elected farmer committees, describes their
powers more fully, and addresses several common misconceptions. The first sec-
tion describes the practical emergence of the elected committees in response to
changes in agricultural governance at the outset of the New Deal and the subse-
quent organizational changes that shaped the committee structures. The second
section traces the power of the committees from their emergence in 1933 to pres-
ent. The final section addresses frequent misconceptions about the power of the
elected committees and their place within the government.
A. HISTORY
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193361 was a watershed moment for agri-
culture, moving the USDA for the first time into a significant regulatory role.62
54. See 16 U.S.C § 590h(b)(5)(E). Congress's choice to limit removal of elected committee members
may have important constitutional consequences, though that is beyond the scope of this Article. For
further discussion of this point, see Galperin, supra note * (manuscript at 40-43).
55. See 16 U.S.C § 590h(b)(5)(D).
56. 7 C.F.R. § 7.23.
57. Id. § 7.1(a).
58. §7.1(f).
59. See, e.g., id. §§ 7.1(c)(1), (f), 7.34.
60. CHRISTOPHER R. KELLEY, NAT'L AGRIC. LAW CTR., THE USDA NATIONAL APPEALS DIVISION:
AN OUTLINE OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE 2 (2003), https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/assets/articles/kelley-nad.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E54-QRPW].
61. Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).
62. See MURRAY R. BENEDICT, FARM POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES 1790-1950: A STUDY OF
THEIR ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 283 (1953).
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Under the Act, Congress sought to raise farm incomes by directly regulating farm
production.63 The Act permitted acreage-reduction agreements, under which the
USDA paid farmers to limit the amount of land on which they would plant certain
crops, thereby lowering the supply and raising the price of those crops.64 The Act
permitted a tax on agricultural processors, with which the USDA paid farmers for
acreage reductions.65 The Act also provided for a new processor licensing scheme
to help collect the tax.66 All of this new authority required new administrative
machinery.67 What the USDA had in 1933 was a well-developed, well-respected,
and well-ensconced research and education program.6 8 What the USDA did not
have was regulatory and enforcement capacity.6 9
To make this transition, many changes within the existing USDA were made.70
But as an initial matter, to get the new payment-for-reduction program started, "a
vast amount of help was needed to sign up millions of farmers, inspect their
fields, and certify them for payments."7 1 "Millions of farmers" undersells the
scale of the effort. In the mid- 1930s, there were 6.8 million farmers in the United
States.7 2 USDA needed help persuading each of these farmers that it was wise to
accept cash payments for plowing up their fields.73
The "vast amount of help" first came from the agricultural Extension
Service.74 The Extension Service was already well-integrated into rural America
and well known to many farmers.75 Founded in 1914, Extension was then, and is
today, a cooperative organization that ties together the USDA and state land-grant
colleges in order to conduct research and provide educational resources to farm-
ers.76 The problem here was that an entity designed for adult education was not
necessarily well-prepared for regulatory administration.77 Extension agents were
physically well-positioned (across the country and in many counties) to support
the new agriculture programs, but given their historic role in advising farmers on
best practices and new technologies, the agents were not substantively well-
positioned.7 8 The tension between regulatory administration and education
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See CHARLES M. HARDIN, THE POLITICS OF AGRICULTURE: SOIL CONSERVATION AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN RURAL AMERICA 115-16 (1952); Frischknecht, supra note 10, at 706.
68. See HARDIN, supra note 67, at 133; Frischknecht, supra note 10, at 707-08.
69. See Frischknecht, supra note 10, at 706.
70. See generally BENEDICT, supra note 62, at 283-84 (describing the early implementation of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act).
71. HARDIN, supra note 67, at 115.
72. GILBERT, supra note 9, at 81.
73. Id. at 84.
74. HARDIN, supra note 67, at 115, 132-33.
75. Id. at 132-33.
76. See id.; Extension, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NAT'L INST. OF FOOD & AGRIC., https://nifa.usda.gov/
extension [https://perma.cc/M5Y6-8JGR] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
77. HARDIN, supra note 67, at 115, 133.
78. See id. at 133; Frischknecht, supra note 10, at 707-08.
1222 [Vol. 108:1213
THE LIFE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEMOCRACY
outreach, along with Extension's grant-based and therefore more tenuous connec-
tion to USDA leadership, made an alternative administrative structure necessary.79
Extension's early role in administering the agricultural adjustment program
was always an emergency stop-gap, not President Roosevelt's long-term plan. In
his now-famous Topeka campaign address, then-Governor Roosevelt first laid
out his plans to pull American agriculture out of its years-long nosedive.s
Central to that speech was his promise that administration of the massive agricul-
tural adjustment program would be decentralized, avoiding too much influence
from Washington.s1 Rather than bureaucracy, which even i 1932 was a target of
bipartisan attack,8 2 President Roosevelt and his agricultural advisors, Henry A.
Wallace and M.L. Wilson, envisioned a system of "agricultural democracy" to
take over the temporary role of the Extension Service.83 Surely, though, as dis-
cussed elsewhere in this Article, ideological commitments to local democracy
were only part of a calculus that also included white supremacy.84
The Agricultural Adjustment Act laid the groundwork for this vision of agri-
cultural democracy. Section 10(b) of the Act permitted the Secretary to "estab-
lish, for the more effective administration of the functions vested in him by this
title, State and local committees."" This authority manifested differently in dif-
ferent regions. In the Midwest, elected committees took root early.86 In the
Southeast, Extension Service county agents appointed committee members.8 7 But
as experience with the committees grew, electoral selection became the norm.
Although it is not obvious on the face of the statute, section 8(b) of the Soil
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936" was understood to mandate
the use of elected committees in response to the broader trend in that direction.89
Over the course of the mid-twentieth century, as USDA and congressional pol-
itics shifted, merger and reorientation of the farmer committees was common, but
their core electoral structure, though tested, remained unchanged. The farmer
committees first lived within the broad structure of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration because the committees' primary purpose was administration of
79. See HARDIN, supra note 67, at 133; Frischknecht, supra note 10, at 707-08.
80. BENEDICT, supra note 62, at 273 ("Later, in his Topeka speech, Roosevelt outlined his farm
program."); Dale Clark, The Farmer as Co-Administrator, 3 PUB. OPINION. Q. 482, 483 (1939)
("Governor Roosevelt in his Topeka campaign address, in which he outlined farm policy, spoke for
decentralized administration."); Frischknecht, supra note 10, at 705 ("In his Topeka address of
September 14, 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that the new farm program would be
decentralized.. . .").
81. See Clark, supra note 80, at 483; Frischknecht, supra note 10, at 705.
82. See BENEDICT, supra note 62, at 273.
83. See Frischknecht, supra note 10, at 705.
84. See infra Section IV.A.
85. Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-10, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 31, 37 (1933).
86. HARDIN, supra note 67, at 116.
87. Id. at 115-16.
88. Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 74-461, § 8(b), 49 Stat. 1148, 1150
(1936) ("In carrying out the provisions of this section, the Secretary is authorized to utilize county and
community committees ..... ).
89. HARDIN, supra note 67, at 116 & n.3.
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the Agricultural Adjustment Act.90 A 1945 USDA reorganization created the
Production and Marketing Administration out of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration.91 The Production and Marketing Administration continued to
house the elected farmer committees.92 Less than a decade later, in 1953, another
USDA reorganization shifted the Production and Marketing Administration's
duties to the new Commodity Stabilization Service, which was itself short-lived
and became the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service in 1961.93
The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service had by far the longest
tenure, remaining home to the elected committees until a USDA reorganization
in 1994.94 The 1994 reorganization created the Farm Service Agency (originally
called the Consolidated Farm Services Agency) by merging the Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service with another branch of the USDA tree,
the Farmers Home Administration.95 The Farmers Home Administration had
grown out of the old Farm Security Administration, which itself began as the
New Deal-era Resettlement Administration.96 Interestingly, this second branch of
the USDA had housed its own inarnation of local committees, but these commit-
tees were appointed rather than elected, and were distinctly advisory and educa-
tional rather than administrative.97
When Congress merged the Farmers Home Administration lineage with the
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service lineage in 1994, maintenance
of the elected committees was a priority of many.98 The reorganization combined
two lines of USDA, both with committee structures. Rather than house two simi-
lar structures in a single agency, Congress made the decision to maintain just one
committee framework and wanted to be sure the elected committee framework
was the one that would survive.99 The reorganization made the elected commit-
tees mandatory and also empowered USDA to use the elected committees for
almost any activity for which USDA had statutory authority.00
90. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 80, at 484 ("The association assume[d] the active responsibility for
local administration of the [Agricultural Adjustment Administration] program through an elected county
committee.").
91. HARDIN, supra note 67, at 106.
92. See id.
93. Agency History, supra note 37.
94. See Alan R. Malasky & William E. Penn, USDA Reorganization--Fact or Fiction?, 25 U. MEM.
L. REV. 1161,1172,1174-75 (1995).
95. Agency History, supra note 37.
96. Wayne D. Rasmussen, New Deal Agricultural Policies After Fifty Years, 68 MINN. L. REV. 353,
366-67 (1983).
97. See, e.g., PETE DANIEL, DISPOSSESSION: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICAN FARMERS
IN THE AGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 223 (2013).
98. See, e.g., Reinventing the U.S. Department of Agriculture: Hearing Before the Info., Justice,
Transp., & Agric. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 103d Cong. 77-78 (1993) (statement
of Leland H. Swenson, President, Nat'l Farmers Union); Review a Proposal for Reorganization of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (Secretary Mike Espy): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 103d
Cong. 52, 99, 122 (1993) (statements of Mike Espy, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Agric., and E. (Kika) de la
Garza, Chairman, H. Comm. on Agric.).
99. H. R. REP. No. 103-714, at 22 (1994); Malasky & Penn, supra note 94, at 1174-75.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(D) (2012); Malasky & Penn, supra note 94, at 1174-75.
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Today, thanks primarily to the 1994 Reorganization Act.o. and the 2002 Farm
Bill, 10 2 a detailed statutory electoral system has replaced the terse hints of 1933
and 1936 and has combined the disparate electoral efforts.103 Congress has
directed the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate electoral procedures, to
include nondiscrimination statements in outreach materials, to provide detailed
public notices of balloting, to have transparent vote counting, and to issue public
reports on every election.10 4 Congress further set across-the-board term limits and
eligibility requirements; for instance, only farmers who participate in farm pro-
grams are permitted to vote or run in committee elections.0 ' USDA's regulations
reflect even more detailed provisions covering issues such as voter eligibility,
resolving tie votes, filling vacancies, dealing with challenges and electoral
appeals, and filling slots in particularly low-population jurisdictions where there
are no nominees on the ballot.106
B. POWER
As attorneys Alan R. Malasky and William E. Penn noted in their early review
of the 1994 USDA reorganization, it was initially hard to guess how USDA would
use the farmer committees given that these committees could technically do
almost anything that USDA could.107 In fact, the committee's responsibilities after
1994 seem to have practically diminished from their peak in the mid-twentieth
century. This section traces the history of the committees' powers.
The central purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and its
replacement, the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936,0 was
to control agricultural production by limiting planted acres.1 09 Farmers would
voluntarily agree to restrict their planting and therefore their output, and the gov-
ernment would make cash payments in return.1 o Under this policy framework,
101. Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-354, § 227, 108 Stat. 3178, 3216-18 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C. and 16 U.S.C.).
102. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 10708, 116 Stat 134,
522-25 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2279-1 (2012)).
103. See also Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 1615, 122 Stat.
1651, 1749 (2008) (adding additional electoral process) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 590h
(2012)).
104. 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
105. See § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(III)(aa).
106. 7 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2019).
107. See Malasky & Penn, supra note 94, at 1175; see also 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(D) ("The
Secretary may use the services of such committees in carrying out programs under other authorities
administered by the Secretary.").
108. The 1936 Act replaced the 1933 Act after the Supreme Court struck down the 1933 Act on
federalism and taxation grounds in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74, 77-78 (1936).
109. E.g., GLBERT, supra note 9, at 83-84.
110. Id. at 84-85; Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-10, § 8(1), 48 Stat. 31, 34 (1933)
(giving the Secretary power to "provide for reduction in the acreage or eduction in the production for
market, or both, of any basic agricultural commodity, through agreements with producers or by other
voluntary methods").
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county committees were essential. The committees would establish t e historical
base of production for farms in their jurisdiction-that is, the committees deter-
mined how much the farmers had grown in the past to allow for calculation of
yield reductions and consequent payments.1 1 Here, Washington, D.C. would dic-
tate how many total acres all farmers in a given county could plant,1 12 and the
committees would take that total acreage allowance and distribute it across partic-
ipating farmers.113 The committees would measure plantings on each farm to ver-
ify that farmers were fulfilling their obligations and qualifying for their
payments.114 When satisfied, the committees would then distribute the cash
payments." And the elected committees would adjudicate disputes when they
arose.116 For instance, if a question of fair allotment, of actual planted acres, or of
the size of the government payment were raised, the committees would resolve
the question.
Such was the role of the committees in the early stages of the New Deal. As the
farm programs became more widespread and more diverse throughout the middle
stages of the New Deal, the responsibility of the committees continued to grow.
Under laws requiring mandatory production limits for cotton and tobacco and for
new soil conservation programs, the farmer committees became responsible for
determining eligibility for payments and loans, and even for imposing penalties
for noncompliance.117 A critical, though little-remembered aspect of the case
Wickard v. Filburn1 1s-famously known for its broad interpretation of the
Commerce Clause-illustrates the real implications of all this committee author-
ity. In Wickard, it was the elected farmer committee in Montgomery County,
Ohio that set farmer Filbum's wheat production quota and enforced the law
against him when he produced excess wheat for his animals and family.119 A
committee of elected farmers made what ended up as a critical decision for fed-
eral regulatory authority over intrastate, and even local, economic decisionmak-
ing when it granted Filbum a small wheat allotment, discovered that he was
growing more than his allotted share, imposed sanctions, and adjudicated the ini-
tial dispute. 120
Among the most important and difficult early responsibilities of the elected
committees was determining how to divide the various federal payments between
the landlord and the tenant farmer-an issue of less importance in the family-
111. GLBERT, supra note 9, at 84.
112. Agricultural Adjustment Act § 8(1), 48 Stat. at 34.
113. GLBERT, supra note 9, at 84; see also id. § 10(b), 48 Stat. at 37.
114. See GILBERT, supra note 9, at 84-85.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, §§ 101, 302, 325, 52 Stat.
31, 31-32, 43-44, 51 (authorizing payment and loan programs as well as penalties for quota violations
and empowering farmer committees to assist in carrying out these provisions.); HARDIN, supra note 67,
at 133-34.
118. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
119. Id. at 114-15.
120. See id.
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farming Midwest, but one of critical importance in the more hierarchical
Southeast.121 This racially and economically charged discretion is key to the
long-term failings of the committees discussed in detail in Part V.
By the 1960s, in addition to their first responsibilities, the committees made
decisions on the direct purchase of farm products (another strategy, in addition to
planting restrictions, to reduce supply of agricultural products on the open mar-
ket) and the management of government-purchased inventories.122 They also
determined eligibility for emergency relief payments, which involved decisions
about the presence or absence of emergency situations in a given county.123
During times of war, the committees were also tasked with ensuring the national
defense agricultural reserves program to assure food availability.1 24
The agricultural adjustment programs of the early New Deal provided the basic
structure of farm policy-and therefore of committee responsibilities-until
1996.125 One of the foundations of these policies was the concept of parity, which
aimed to keep farm prices high enough that farm income was roughly equal to
pre-World War I levels.1 26 In the 1960s, Congress abandoned parity and made
most of the production-control restrictions voluntary again,12 7 but this likely only
reduced the burden on committees, not the nature of their responsibilities. In
1996, however, the nature of farm programs shifted from price support managed
by federal regulation to direct payments tied to market conditions.128 This shift
began the process of trimming, though by no means obliterating, committee
responsibilities. The modern payment programs, including loan-deficiency pay-
ments and traditional conservation payments, are still implemented in varying
degrees by elected county committees.129 However, these are quantitative deci-
sions that somewhat limit committee discretion-at least as compared to the
height of the committees' sweeping authority.
Certainly, discretionary decisions are still part of committee action. Committees,
for instance, can make individual adjudicatory decisions, such as a decision to
grant relief from certain conservation restrictions if they determine that holding
121. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIvw RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN FARM PROGRAMS: AN APPRAISAL
OF SERVICES RENDERED BY AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 90 (1965).
122. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. STABLIZATION & CONSERVATION SERV., REVIEW OF THE
FARMER COMMITTEE SYSTEM: REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMITTEE 7-8 (1962) [hereinafter 1962
REVIEW].
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. SUSAN A. SCHNEIDER, FOOD, FARMING, AND SUSTAINABITY: READINGS IN AGRICULTURAL
LAW 9 (2011).
126. See id. at 10.
127. Id.; Nathan A. Rosenberg & Bryce Wilson Stucki, The Butz Stops Here: Why the Food
Movement Needs to Rethink Agricultural History, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 12, 18 (2017).
128. SCHNEIDER, supra note 125, at 10-11. The 2014 Farm Bill further changed this system, such that
the current farm programs might now be described as a mix of crop insurance, commodity payments,
and conservation programs. E-mail Interview with Nathan Rosenberg, Visiting Scholar, Food Law &
Policy Clinic, Harvard Law Sch. (June 6, 2019).
129. SUSAN A. SCHNEIDER, FOOD, FARMING, AND SUSTAINABITY: READINGS IN AGRICULTURAL
LAW 71 (2d ed. 2016).
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a farmer to the statutory restrictions would result in economic hardship.13 0 They
can judge whether a farmer planted a crop by certain threshold dates, which dic-
tate whether the farmer is eligible for various federal payments. When a
farmer proposes to transfer disaster payments to a new landowner, the commit-
tees have discretion to disapprove of such a transfer.13 2 And committees can
make important countywide, legislative-like policy determinations in addition to
these individualized orders. For example, committees can set the countywide
"final planting date" for a given crop, after which a crop, if destroyed or dam-
aged by natural forces, is not eligible for payment.133
The Farm Service Agency (FSA) itself makes understanding the exact scope of
committee responsibilities difficult because the bulk of their material on the
farmer committees is for recruitment purposes and therefore somewhat vague.
Still, the FSA nicely summarizes the general array of committee duties. FSA rec-
ognizes that the committees today "are a critical component of the day-to-day
operations of FSA and allow grassroots input and local administration of federal
farm programs."134 The committee members are asked to use "their judgment and
knowledge" to administer farm programs, specifically "[i]ncome safety-net loans
and payments, including setting county average yields for commodities; [c]onser-
vation programs; [i]ncentive, indemnity, and disaster payments for some com-
modities; [e]mergency programs; and [p] ayment eligibility." 135
FSA likewise promotes hiring and supervising FSA county executive directors
as one of the central roles of the committees.1 36 The directors themselves have
significant discretionary responsibilities that FSA does not explicitly describe as
committee responsibilities. But because the elected committees hire, fire, and
supervise the executive directors, it is most accurate to define the executive direc-
tors as agents of the elected committees, and thus describe the executive direc-
tors' tasks as inherent to and delegated from the committees. Among these tasks
are running day-to-day operations of farm program administration within a
130. MEGAN STUBBS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42459, CONSERVATION COMPLIANCE AND U.S.
FARM POLICY 2 (2016).
131. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FORM CCC-471 NAP BP, NONINSURED CROP DISASTER
ASSISTANCE APPLICATION FOR COVERAGE 3 (2015) [hereinafter FORM CCC-471 NAP BP].
132. Id. at 17.
133. Id. at 3, 7.
134. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, COUNTY COMMITTEE ELECTIONS-2019: FACT
SHEET (2019), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/FactSheets/2019/county
committeeelectionsfact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4XM-VDES].
135. Id.
136. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, BE A LEADER WITH FARM SERVICE AGENCY
COUNTY COMMITTEE ELECTIONS 3 (2018), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/
usdafiles/NewsRoom/County-Committee-Elections/pdf/2018_cocpowerpoint-forstakeholders.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LT6W-FPM2] [hereinafter BE A LEADER]; see Press Release, Dana Rogge, U.S.
Dep't of Agric., Farm Serv. Agency, FSA County Committee Nominations Launch June 15 (May 22,
2018), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/news-room/news-releases/2018/nr_20180522_rel_0085 [https://
perma.cc/7ZCM-YLMW].
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county, hiring, firing, and managing other local staff, and accounting for all FSA
property and finances in the elected committee's jurisdiction.13 7
In addition to their administrative responsibilities of hiring personnel and
implementing various farm programs, FSA also identifies and markets the com-
mittees as an important advisory link between farm communities and the federal
government. FSA asks farmers to "Be the Voice of Your Community" by provid-
ing "local agricultural guidance and insight" and sharing "information about FSA
opportunities within your community and focus[ing] outreach efforts to under-
served producers and beginning farmers."138 Committee members, the FSA
urges, "[e]nsure USDA's farm programs continue to serve farmers, ranchers and
families."139 They may represent local priorities, but they also plainly have the
power to use the authority of government to advance those priorities.
C. MISCONCEPTIONS
Scholars and practitioners unfamiliar with farm programs seem to have two
general reactions when first leaming about the elected county committees. First,
they say that the committees seem to be local governments rather than federal
bodies. Second, the committees sound like advisory committees similar to the
few other examples of electoral bureaucracy.14 Both reactions are as easily
understandable as they are plainly wrong.
The committees are not local or state governments. This mistake is under-
standable because the committees are arranged according to local jurisdictional
boundaries-they are, after all, typically county committees.14 1 They have
some similarities to conservation districts (sometimes also called soil conser-
vation districts or soil-and-water conservation districts).14 2 These districts are
also overseen by elected committees4 3 and part of their responsibility has been
to help implement federal law.144 But quite unlike the USDA county commit-
tees, the Conservation Districts are creatures of state law.145 The Roosevelt
Administration envisioned and championed the districts and drafted model en-
abling legislation, but enactment of that legislation was strictly a matter of state
137. CAROL CANADA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40179, FARM SERVICE AGENCY: STATE EXECUTIVE
DIRECTORS, AND STATE AND COUNTY/AREA COMMITTEES 5 (2009).
138. BE A LEADER, supra note 136, at 4.
139. Id. at 5.
140. This assertion is based on my personal observations when discussing and workshopping this
Article with colleagues, many of whom are named in the acknowledgements.
141. See 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(B) (2012).
142. See, e.g., NACD History, NAT'L Ass'N OF CONSERVATION DISTs., http://www.nacdnet.org/
about-nacd/nacd-history/ [https://perma.cc/JZ6L-JMEA] (last visited Feb. 17, 2020).
143. See Committee Structure, NAT'L Ass'N OF CONSERVATION DISTS., https://www.nacdnet.org/
about-nacd/nacd-leadership/committee-structure/ [https://perma.cc/2YMS-UB3G] (last visited Feb. 17,
2020).
144. See Larry C. Frarey, Ron Jones & Staci J. Pratt, Conservation Districts as the Foundation for
Watershed-Based Programs to Prevent and Abate Polluted Agricultural Runoff, 18 HAMINE L. REV
151, 153 (1994).
145. About NACD, NAT'L Ass'N OF CONSERVATION DiSTS., https://www.nacdnet.org/about-nacd/
[https://perma.cc/QLG6-BTLP] (last visited Feb. 17, 2020).
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prerogative.1 4 6 The committees also look something like a local school district
or a state or local housing authority, both of which are creatures of state or
local government but receive federal funds and implement federal programs.147
The county committees do not fit either of these molds because: they are exclu-
sively a creation of federal law; they are statutorily defined as part of a federal
agency;14 8 they do not carry out any functions under state law; and they report
up through the USDA, not to any local government authority.
Given FSA's promotional materials, paired with the electoral composition of
the committees, it is also understandable that there is an impression of the com-
mittees as mere advisors, rather than as bona fide administrators. The committees
have an advisory function, but this section should make clear that unlike the fed-
eral advisory committees with which administrative law scholars and practi-
tioners are familiar,149 elected county committees have both quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative authority as well. They can make countywide policy decisions
such as establishing the availability of, and setting dates for eligibility in, disaster
relief programs.5 0 They can also make regular, individualized factual determina-
tions including whether economic conditions should exempt a farmer from fed-
eral conservation requirements,15 1 whether a given farmer planted crops by a
given date, or whether local conditions merit certain categories of federal
payments. 152
Corroborating the meaningful regulatory and adjudicatory role of the commit-
tees, more than a handful of litigation has stemmed from committee decisions
over the past years and decades. In just the last several years, courts have dealt
with committee decisions related to the application of disaster assistance cover-
age,1 53 farm inspection and subsequent denial of Conservation Reserve Program
benefits,1 54 and loan amortization approval.1 5 5 This quantity of litigation is
unlikely to arise from a merely advisory function but is common for an
146. NACD History, supra note 142.
147. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(6) (2012) (describing public housing agencies); see generally
Benton Martin, An Increased Role for the Department of Education in Addressing Federalism Concerns,
2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 79 (describing the role of federal involvement in local school governance and
recommending reforms).
148. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6991(2) (2012).
149. See, e.g., Daniel E. Walters, Note, The Justiciability of Fair Balance Under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act: Toward a Deliberative Process Approach, 110 MICH. L. REV. 677, 679-80
(2012).
150. See FORM CCC-471 NAP BP, supra note 131, at 3, 6-7.
151. MEGAN STUBBS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42459, CONSERVATION COMPLIANCE AND U.S.
FARM POLICY 2 (2016).
152. See FORM CCC-471 NAP BP, supra note 131, at 8-13.
153. See Hixson v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 15-cv-02061-RBJ, 2017 WL 2544637, at *1 (D. Colo.
June 13, 2017).
154. See Mittelstadt v. Perdue, 913 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2019). Inexplicably, the court at times
refers to the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service as overseeing the committees, id. at
634, despite the consolidation of the Service into the Farm Service Agency over two decades earlier, see
supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
155. See United States v. Pratt, No. 4:16-cv-00108-DCN, 2017 WL 4341850, at *1-2 (D. Idaho Sept.
29, 2017).
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administrative program that determines the legal rights and obligations of private
individuals and businesses.15 6
Further, the scholarship on advisory arms of government offers several theoret-
ical justifications for advisory committees, but none explain the nature of the
county committees. One theory of advisory bureaucracy, the "Enacting Congress
Account," describes advisory committees as congressional tools to maintain
influence beyond initial passage of a substantive statute that the advisors help
implement.15 7 In the case of farmer committees, this theory is inapplicable
because the farmer committee members are elected, not responsive to Congress.
A new article by Professors Brian D. Feinstein and Daniel J. Hemel introduces
what might be called the "agency-head independence account" of advisory com-
mittees, which posits that agency heads can use advisory committees to gain ex-
pertise distinct from what is available within their own civil service staff."1s This
theory has much to recommend as an explanation of advice-giving in the
Executive Branch, but it still fails to explain the county committees because their
electoral constitution separates the committees from both political appointees at
the head of agencies as well as from civil service employees.
The "Agency Reputation Account" of advisory committees holds that advisory
committees help increase buy-in from the regulated industry by bringing it into the
policy process.159 As discussed in more depth in the next section, this account cer-
tainly helps to understand the purpose of fanner committees. Unlike other accounts
of advisory committees, the electoral structure of the fanner committees does not
undermine the theory because lections are one way to engage a regulated commu-
nity. However, Professors Feinstein and Hemel point out that this Agency
Reputation Account only explains a small group of committees within the govern-
ment,160 and fails to explain the vast majority of advisory committees that are not
drawn primarily from the regulated industry. Thus, although the Agency Reputation
Account does indeed help explain elected farmer committees, it does not suggest
that the committees are equivalent to advisory committees. When paired with the
committees' clear administrative functions, the inapplicability of advisory theories
confirms the fundamentally administrative role of the county committees.
The preceding sections, I hope, provide a new resource for understanding the
committees. What they do not provide is an explanation of why the farmer com-
mittees are elected in the first place and therefore unique within the entire
156. Any action of advisory committees, in contrast to actions by the farmer committees, is unlikely
to be enough, on its own, to support Article III standing because any injury that may exist could not be
traced to the non-binding actions of an advisory committee. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that causation is a constitutional requirement in a standing analysis);
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (stating that an injury must be "fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct").
157. Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Outside Advisors Inside Agencies, 108 GEO. L.J. 1139,
1153 (2020).
158. Id. at 1159-60.
159. Id. at 1155.
160. Id. at 1157-58.
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expanse of the federal bureaucracy. The next Part is an attempt to explain the
motivations behind reliance on administrative democracy.
III. PHILOSOPHY
The emergency New Deal agriculture programs needed geographically-
widespread administration, but it was not essential for this administration to be
elected. Pairing local administration with elections was, at least in part, an ideo-
logical commitment, not a practical necessity.
The goal of this section is to understand why the USDA utilizes elected-farmer
committees to administer federal farm programs or, at least, how the committees
fit within various theories of political legitimacy. Given that divining congres-
sional intent is always a challenge, this endeavor would be hard, arguably impos-
sible, if Congress were the only prime mover.16 1 The ad hoc nature of the early
farmer committees, which were authorized by Congress but were established and
operated differently from region to region and county to county,162 made this
endeavor even harder at the outset. Given these difficulties, the effort is signifi-
cant and understanding its motivating ideologies, its governing philosophies,
helps us move beyond platitudes and into a meaningful understanding of how
elected administrators differ from appointed administrators. It is certainly tempt-
ing to say that because we are dealing with a diverse set of decisionmakers, there
is no point in looking into subjective purpose-that digging below the surface
will uncover esoteric disagreements rather than a singular justification. But it
would be foolish to pretend that nothing motivates policy action. A refusal to
explore motivations does not move us beyond competing ideologies; it just leaves
us with untested, unexercised, lazy theories. Further, there is no reason to believe
that distinct philosophies cannot work together to support a policy goal. That
seems to be exactly the case here.
The farmer committees are elected because a number of different ideologies
came together to recommend, for better or worse, an electoral structure. The
intellectuals in the Roosevelt Administration relied on modem visions of
Jeffersonianism, with its agrarian idealism, to support the electoral structure.
Contemporary political commentators pointed to the merits of deliberative de-
mocracy and civic republicanism, with their attention to expressive process, as
justifications. It was not long, however, before critics pointed to less lofty, even
categorically repugnant, arguments for electoral administration. Some critics
described the elections as a way to put regulated industry in charge of its own reg-
ulations, that is, a form of narrow pluralism or New Deal corporatism. Others,
particularly more modem commentators, explain the electoral structure as simple
elitism and racism-a scheme in which the powerful could use elections to
161. See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992) (arguing that Congress is a "they," not an "it" and
therefore has no single intent).
162. See GLBERT, supra note 9, at 85-86 (discussing the variety of modes of selecting local
committee members and regional ideological and demographic differences of the committees).
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maintain their preferred social hierarchy. This Part will explore these accounts in
more detail.
A. JEFFERSONIANISM
Jeffersonianism is the most obvious tradition to undergird electoral farm
administration given the Jeffersonian plea for rural leadership. Jeffersonianism,
or Jeffersonian democracy, was a call for highly local democracy based on
"face-to-face" interactions, emerging particularly from farm country.16 3 The
Jeffersonian ideal dominated American self-identity, if not actual governance
from the Founding, naturally reaching a crescendo during the Jefferson
Administration.1 By the time of the Great Depression, the idea of rural republi-
can democracy had faded from the public consciousness and urbanism, industrial-
ism, and expertise had taken its place as visions of the American ideal.165
In his famous article describing how the New Deal changed American consti-
tutionalism, Professor Cass Sunstein argued that the New Deal fully rejected the
notion of Jeffersonianism,1 66 and that "the belief in localism seemed unrealistic
or perverse."167 However, certain intellectuals within President Roosevelt's
USDA, as well as many farmers themselves, still maintained a vision that inde-
pendent, rural farmers not only should lead society, but in fact had a duty to gov-
em the country.168 This is the crux of the Jeffersonian vision of America.
"[Jefferson's] political economy required self-sufficient property owners in order
to meet the prerequisites of democracy."1 69 In President Jefferson's own words,
"those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God. . . ."170 If farmers
embodied the ideal of self-sufficiency necessary to energize not only democracy,
but humanity, then it was self-evident and a fortiori that they also possessed the
spirit to govern their own industry.
Jeffersonians may have seen a problem at the start of the New Deal.
Jeffersonians valued rural farmers for the special role farmers were supposed to
play in governing, but they could look far and wide and find little example of the
Jeffersonian ideal in practice.171 The elected farmer committees could implement
the Jeffersonian vision in a way it had yet to be implemented. 172 The committees
163. Id. at 30; Sunstein, supra note 1, at 442.
164. See GILBERT, supra note 9, at 30.
165. See Jess Gilbert, Agrarian Intellectuals in a Democratizing State: A Collective Biography of
USDA Leaders in the Intended New Deal, in THE COUNTRYSIDE IN THE AGE OF THE MODERN STATE:
POLITICAL HISTORIES OF RURAL AMERICA 213, 220-21 (Catherine McNicol Stock & Robert D. Johnston
eds., 2001); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 504-05.
166. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 442.
167. Id. at 504.
168. Gilbert, supra note 165, at 221.
169. Id.
170. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 164-65 (William Peden ed., Univ. of
N.C. Press 2d ed. 1996) (1955).
171. See GILBERT, supra note 165, at 220-22; Sunstein, supra note 1, at 504-05.
172. See GILBERT, supra note 165, at 220-22.
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would draw on rural energy and, in turn, they would empower farmers to grab
hold of the authority Jeffersonians believed rightly belonged to them.173
Pure Jeffersonian idealism, however, was at an awkward crossroads in the
early 1930s. On the one hand, the number of farmers in the country was at its
peak, with numbers reaching 6.8 million, 17 4 and the struggles of the farm econ-
omy were at the forefront of national politics.175 On the other hand, the broader
mood of the country was invested in "rising urban-industrial capitalism. "176
Certainly other aspects of the New Deal, such as the National Industrial
Recovery Act with its empowerment of industrial cartels, pointed aggressively
towards urban-industrial capitalism, not towards modest-rural individual-
ism.177 Jeffersonianism, therefore, seems a fitting explanation for the inclusion
of farmers in administration, but it cannot be the sole justification in a world,
and in a presidential administration, that was not chiefly committed to the vir-
tues of ruralism.
B. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND CIVIC REPUBLICANISM
The local jurisdictions of the elected committees fit well within political tradi-
tions that advance popular control through civic deliberation. The related ideas of
deliberative democracy and civic republicanism are such ideals. They are farther
reaching than Jeffersonianism insofar as they are not tied to any geography or vo-
cation, but to process. This latitude makes them more complete, or at least more
complementary, justifications for electing administrators. Civic republicanism
takes agrarianism, urbanism, and other ideological frameworks at face value and
argues that rather than choosing an overriding preference, government must ena-
ble the public to engage in group deliberation and itself reach a satisfying outcome
to a given debate. 178 Deliberative democracy similarly aims to move beyond the
substance of issues and concentrate on the process of reasoning, focusing on self-
realization through participation.179 John Dewey, a leading twentieth-century pro-
ponent of deliberative democracy, saw communication as central to the meaning
of democracy,180 and smaller-scale institutions seemed to facilitate that robust
democratic ideal.81 Thus, civic republicanism and deliberative democracy con-
verge on the general promise that "government's primary responsibility is to ena-
ble the citizenry to deliberate about altering preferences and to reach consensus
on the common good."18 2
173. See id.
174. Id. at 81.
175. JONATHAN COPPEss, THE FAULT LINES OF FARM POLICY: A LEGISLATIVE AND POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE FARM BLL 16 (2018).
176. Gilbert, supra note 165, at 220.
177. See National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 1, 48 Stat. 195, 195 (1933).
178. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1511, 1514 (1992).
179. See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 73, 142, 151 (1927).
180. See id. at 142.
181. Id. at 131.
182. See Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1514.
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The existence of elected committees that connect with the relevant public at a
grassroots level arguably provides a justification for the exercise of authority and
the impetus for the "democratization of rural America."183 Writing in terms that
Dewey himself might well have used, sociologist Jess Gilbert explains that he
farmer committee system was a "participatory form of rationalization" and "a
democratic type of modernization that combined bottom-up (local citizen) and
top-down (state expert) initiatives . . . that could result in progressive social
reform."184
Justification of elected farmer committees along these deliberative and civic
republican lines, however, seems to paper over two related but distinct issues:
decentralization and elections. Elections may help foment more direct democracy
and engage individuals in collective decisionmaking by creating an easily exer-
cised and easily understood form of participation. Decentralization, if it means
geographical diffusion, might make electoral participation more meaningful. As
the electorate gets smaller, the weight of each vote increases. Therefore, the two
concepts work together. Elections can facilitate participation. Decentralization in
the form of localism can make electoral participation more potent. In that way,
the elected farmer committees tend to manifest the core ideals of civic republi-
canism and deliberative democracy.
But civic republicanism and deliberative democracy also fail to fully explain
the elected farmer committees. The farmer committees are, indeed, farmer com-
mittees. Only farmers (and ranchers) are eligible to sit on the committees and
vote for committee members.8 5 But the committees are even more exclusive
than that. Only farmers who participate in the federal farm programs are eligible
to sit on the committees and vote for committee members.186 Under a civic repub-
lican or deliberative democratic theory, participation would not be limited only to
farmers let alone a subset of farmers. The existing structure, limiting participation
to farmers alone, betrays "the unstated but implicit belief that agricultural legisla-
tion and administration are the concerns of farmers only," as political-science
professor Grant McConnell wrote.187 That belief is untenable. Professor
McConnell continued, "Stated thus bluntly, the idea is absurd; anything that
affects the price or supply of food and clothing is certainly a matter of general
concern. In fact, however, the idea is rarely stated thus bluntly and the insistence
that farmers should make decisions on farm affairs enjoys much respect."8 8
Given that civic republicanism and deliberative democracy would justify local
elected committees only if the committees were also thoroughly democratic and
open to a larger array of interests-that is, only if their eligibility structure did not
183. See GILBERT, supra note 9, at xiv.
184. Id. at 5.
185. 7 C.F.R. §§ 7.5, 7.8 (2019).
186. Id.
187. See GRANT MCCONNELL, THE DECLINE OF AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY 166 (1969).
188. Id.
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presume an a priori special interest unique to farmers-altemative or additive
explanations are still needed.
C. CORPORATISM AND PLURALISM
Putting only farmers in control of agricultural policy demonstrates a political
commitment to interest-group-based governance. Corporatism and pluralism
both fit this mold. Pluralism is the theory that government's role is to facilitate
negotiations among heterogeneous interest groups in order to "implement deals
that divide political spoils according to the pre-political preferences of interest
groups."189 Said differently, pluralism views the government as "only an umpire
to avert and remedy trespasses of one group upon another."190 Dewey and
Professor Mark Seidenfeld both explicitly reject pluralism and its presumption
that politics launders rather than creates policy preferences.191
Corporatism is a version of pluralism, one with particular salience during the
New Deal, which grants it one of the strongest claims as an explanation for the
elected farmer committees. Corporatism is a version of pluralism insofar as cor-
poratism involves "state sponsorship" of corporate interests, which themselves
are among the groups that government seeks to balance in an ideal pluralist sys-
tem.192 In corporatism, one group, the private industry, is imbued with govem-
ment authority. The New Deal's earliest and most far-reaching program, the
National Recovery Administration, was an intense implementation of corpora-
tism in practice, "delegating governmental authority to private cartels."193
Aspects of agriculture law also reflected the corporatist inclination such as the
milk-marketing programs, which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor described as "a
cooperative venture among the Secretary, handlers, and producers.... Nowhere
in the Act, however, is there an express provision for participation by consumers
in any proceeding."1 94 In many respects, the delegation of authority to farmer
committees-which one must understand as committees of self-interested and
self-regulating industry participants without outside influence-is simply corpo-
ratism tempered by the residue of Jeffersonianism and the symbols of democracy.
Peeking behind the legislative veil helps show that the private agricultural
interests were not afraid to exert influence over policymaking and to command
special treatment. Professor McConnell recounts a story of almost shocking
hubris. In the 1920s, the American Farm Bureau Federation demanded that when
members of Congress participated in unrecorded votes on agricultural issues, the
members must report those votes, officially unavailable, "directly to the
189. Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1514.
190. DEWEY, supra note 179, at 73.
191. See id.; Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1514-15.
192. See James Q. Whitman, Of Corporatism, Fascism, and the First New Deal, 39 AM. J. COMP. L.
747, 749-50 (1991).
193. Id. at 748.
194. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 346-47 (1984).
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Federation offices."195 This pressure is not conclusive as to the purpose of creat-
ing elected committees, but it demonstrates the strength of industry in the halls of
Congress.
Scholars and administrators alike were not blind to the notes of corporatism in
the farmer committee system. Professor Theodore J. Lowi, one of the leading crit-
ics of pluralism and corporatism in government during the twentieth century,
wrote the influential "polemic" (his word), The End of Liberalism, which argued
that government hides its coercive authority by delegating decisionmaking to pri-
vate actors and technocrats. In doing so, the government thereby cuts off the pos-
sibility of transparent and open conversation about the use of government
coercion.196 The End of Liberalism used U.S. agriculture programs as one of its
central lines of evidence. "Agriculture," Lowi wrote, "is that field of American
government where the distinction between public and private has come closest to
being completely eliminated."19 7 How has this merger happened?
This has been accomplished not by public expropriation of private domain-
as would be true of the nationalization that Americans fear-but by private
expropriation of public authority. That is the feudal pattern: fusion of all sta-
tuses and functions and governing through rigid but personalized fealties. In
modem European dress, that was the corporativistic way; it is also the pluralist
way, the way of contemporary liberalism in the United States."'
As evidence of this corporatist and pluralist merger of the public and the pri-
vate, Lowi bases his critique squarely on the elected farmer committees. 199When
the stakes of coercive authority are high, as they are in agricultural regulation -
particularly in limiting production- government tends to shirk responsibility
and instead rely on expertise and local self-govemance.200 Creating such a narrow
and self-interested political space leaves little chance for change. "There is an
immense capacity in each agriculture system, once created, to maintain itself and
to resist any type of representation except its own."201 As a result, "in agriculture,
as in many other fields, the regulators are powerless without he consent of the
regulated.' '202
Professor Mancur Olson's famous work on group theory was written around
the same time as The End of Liberalism and reached a similar conclusion about
the farm programs, tendering that, by entrusting agricultural regulation to private
agriculture interests, the government effectively created new pressure groups that
195. GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 18 (Vintage Books 1970)
(1966).
196. See generally THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITED STATES, at xxi (40th anniversary ed. 2009) (explaining the purpose and point of view of his work).
197. Id. at 68.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 72.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 75.
202. Id. at 77.
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made it difficult, if not impossible, for those outside the agriculture bloc to influ-
ence agriculture policy. 203 In a world where regulatory capture by regulated inter-
ests is a frequent concern, narrow electoral structures make capture the purpose
of the administrative configuration rather than the unintentional consequence.
Professors Lowi and Olson each ad expertise in governance, not specifically
in agriculture, but agriculture policy experts had similar, and even more informed
critiques, which tended to argue that corporatism was not merely the structure of
the farmer committees, but the purpose. Reed Frischknecht, a professor of eco-
nomics and former administrator within the USDA, complained in 1953 that
although political spokesmen promoted the farm programs as rightful because
they were administered locally by elected farmers, the reality was a bifurcated
system of, on the one hand, farmers who were unprepared for the complexities of
administration and, on the other, a powerful 'hard core' of professional farmer
committeemen who dominate the system."204 This politics of self-aggrandize-
ment and enrichment is exactly what Professors Olson a d Lowi lamented.
In 1939, Dale Clark, then an employee in the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration, approached the farmer committees with more optimism, but also
with the notion that the key to legitimacy in government programs that "invade
branches of our economic life" is to merge the public and the corporate.205
Obliquely referring to the reality, if not the desirability, of corporate pluralism,
Clark wrote that "[t]he comprehensive set of devices for group representation and
consultation with which the farm group has been equipped may play a significant
part in better adapting democratic technique to the group pattern of machine-age
society."2 06 Clark continues:
This whole trend toward democratic participation of members of an economic
group in administration seems to be prompted by a realization that the techni-
ques of democracy must be fitted to a society in which the group pattern is
becoming more dominant. It is inevitable that farmers and members of other
interest groups press for expression and representation in the governmental
policies directly affecting them. It becomes a question whether or not regularly
instituted procedures of consultation with government should be provided, or
whether the group should find its way to government through informal means,
such as the lobby.207
In the case of the farmer committees, Congress and the USDA opted to give
local economic interests a voice not through informal procedures, but through
formality. The farmer committeeman "does, in fact, have some quasi-official
203. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPs 149, 151 (1971).
204. See Frischknecht, supra note 10, at 719.
205. Clark, supra note 80, at 482.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 483-84.
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status; he is an elected local administrator serving [as] an instrumentality of the
government.' '208
In his 1971 Ph.D. dissertation, future political science professor Ivan Garth
Youngberg put the corporatist compromise most bluntly. He argued that the
Roosevelt Administration, farm organizations, and Congress all knew that dra-
matic action was needed to improve the farm economy, but there was less agree-
ment on specific policy solutions.20 9 The Administration and Congress avoided
choosing and instead turned the decisionmaking over to industry leaders.210
"Their decision to utilize farmers-to bring prospective clients into the adminis-
trative structure-was a practical way to not only create immediate and necessary
administrative machinery, but also to minimize opposition ... ."211
Ultimately, Youngberg concluded that this corporatist political compromise,
cloaked in promises of democracy, was merely a strategy of deception.2 12 He
implies the critical question that the previous section of this Article on civic
republicanism and deliberative democracy ended with: How can we pretend that
agricultural policy is only a matter of farm governance when it is really a matter
of broad public interest?213 If we agree that regulation of food production touches
on lives far beyond farm country, then it is hard to maintain the fagade of democ-
racy when the privilege of democratic participation is decided by industrial
classifications. It is much easier to see that what looks like the privilege of partici-
pating is in fact a payment for compliance.
A similar critique by Professor Morton Grodzins agrees that the electoral sys-
tem is a cloak, but a cloak for federal rather than corporate control. "Democratic
forms may camouflage central control," Professor Grodzins wrote in 1962.214 "To
the extent that Washington officials preserve the committees in order to mask
central control, or make it more palatable, they are guilty of using democratic
forms in an authoritarian manner."2 15
Whether a crude scheme for obedience or an idealistic conviction in pluralistic,
corporate self-govemance, the weight of evidence suggests that corporatism and
control, more than idealized democracy, were central factors in the creation of
elected farmer committees. Though it is impossible to settle on any causal proof,
there remain still other drivers of the electoral system: elitism and racism.
208. Id. at 485.
209. Ivan Garth Youngberg, Federal Administration and Participatory Democracy: The ASCS
Farmer Committee System 28-29 (Aug. 1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign) (on file with the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 36.
212. Id. at 4-5.
213. See id. at 35-36 (discussing the broad public outrage that often surrounds farm policy and the
"clientele"-based solutions employed to implement that policy).
214. 1962 REVIEW, supra note 122, at 46-D.
215. Id.
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D. ELITISM AND RACISM
Using an electoral system for farm administration points to a basic desire to
maintain the social status quo, to "preserve[] the traditional structure of agri-
culture." 2 16 President Roosevelt and his USDA leadership were certainly not
driven by a desire to upend American agriculture,217 and neither Congress nor
the American people seemed keen to reshape the power structure.2 1 8 Historian
Pete Daniel goes a step further. He explains that the administrators used a
"semblance of democracy" to further their own social preferences, which
included "trimming away" black farmers, poor farmers, and low-tech farm
practices.2 19 "Discrimination," Daniel writes, "was also inscribed onto New
Deal legislation."2 20 As the title of the first chapter of his book implies, main-
taining a social hierarchy and furthering racial divides were the "intended con-
sequences" of the farm programs.221
There were many built-in mechanisms for discrimination. The first and clearest
way for powerful farmers to promote their own interests was to control the flow
of information.222 The New Deal farm programs brought with them huge infu-
sions of money and technology, and by dominating local politics and connections
with the federal government, local elites were able to direct these opportunities to
themselves and their compatriots.223 The best example of this strategy was the
effort to have all farm payments flow to landlords rather than to tenant farmers,
who were disadvantaged by laws across the farm programs.22 4 By the time elec-
toral committees took root, the problem only became worse. Elite landowners
dominated county agricultural leadership.2 25 Plus, although there were black
216. Rasmussen, supra note 96, at 354. See also 1962 REVIEW, supra note 122, at 46-F-G ("The very
fact of intimate acquaintanceship with and participation in the local community may lead not to even-
handed justice but to subservience to the powerful and neglect of the weak. (It is worth noting that in all
the county committees of the South there has never been, as far as I can discover, a single Negro
member.)"); DANIEL, supra note 97, at 61 (describing how the county committee system "from the
beginning" set up a system for elite domination of other farmers, particularly black farmers); U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 121, at 62 ( "[The Farmers Home Administration's] use of
Negroes in its administrative structure has conformed to the patterns of a segregated society.");
Agricultural Stabilization and the Negro, supra note 12, at 1121-22 (arguing that the committee
structure is "infected with racial discrimination").
217. Rasmussen, supra note 96, at 376.
218. Id. at 367.
219. DANIEL, supra note 97, at 9.
220. Id. at 10.
221. See id. at 1 (chapter entitled "Intended Consequences").
222. See id. at 12, 32-33.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Louis Cantor, A Prologue to the Protest Movement: The Missouri Sharecropper
Roadside Demonstration of 1939, 55 J. AM. HisT. 804, 809 (1969) ("The parity check was made out to
the landlord, who was supposed to share it with his tenants according to the portion each tenant held in
the crop. Many landlords found it easier to evict their croppers, keep the entire check, and work their
land with day labor. [Administration] planners had anticipated this, but had done very little to guard
against it."); Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 127, at 14 (explaining that New Deal farm programs were
designed to benefit large landowners at the expense of farm labor, tenant farmers, and sharecroppers.).
225. HARDIN, supra note 67, at 119.
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landowners, 22 many black farmers were tenants, and nearly all black farmers-
whether tenants or owners-were excluded from decisionmaking.2 27 in many
cases, indirect elections further educed the opportunity for marginalized farmers
to take leadership roles.2 28 With unyielding, wealthy, white control over the com-
mittees, it was easy for members to direct benefits only to those like themselves.
In one instance, a black farmer near Lexington, Mississippi requested an
increase to his cotton allotment.229 In an apparent attempt to punish the farmer for
his request, the staff of the elected committee remeasured the farmer's cotton
plantings, which had always previously measured at 3 acres, and determined that
it was now 4.3 acres.230 The remeasurement forced the farmer to plow up more
than an acre of his already small cotton crop.231 This is just one example. It is not
hard to imagine the damage that a malicious committee could cause when using
race and income as key factors in deciding which farmers receive loans, how
much farmers can plant, and which farming methods to advance.232 Committees
rejected applicants based on race,2 33 refused to share information outside their
closest social groups,2 34 and simply lied when disfavored farmers-primarily
black farmers-asked the direct questions about USDA programs.235
After receiving complaints about committees treating black farmers this way, a
USDA employee defended the all-white committees by grumbling that black
farmers chose not to participate.2 36 That assertion runs counter to the evidence,
which reveals that white farmers actively and intentionally stopped black farmers
from participating.237 For nearly 300 pages, Daniel documents the efforts of black
farmers, young civil rights activists, and others, to increase representation on
elected farmer committees in the face of physical violence and misinformation
that would be familiar to anybody who has looked at other contemporaneous
efforts of the Civil Rights Movement.238
One of the important lessons we can learn from a survey of the ideals that
undergird the farmer committees is that a policy premised on superficial
226. DANIEL, supra note 97, at 10.
227. See id. at 28; Cantor, supra note 224, at 809, 822 (explaining that committees were dominated
and controlled by large farmers and landlords). The roots of this discriminatory structure are varied.
Widespread and long-standing societal discrimination no doubt played a central role. Because the
electoral structure built off a base of appointed leadership, see Frischknecht, supra note 10, at 709, it is
easy to imagine an elite, all-white appointed committee setting up electoral procedures and selectively
sharing electoral information in a way that disadvantaged black famers, small farmers, and poor farmers.
228. See Frischknecht, supra note 10, at 711 (describing the process for convention-based rather than
direct elections).
229. DANIEL, supra note 97, at 23.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., id. at 28.
233. See id. at 23.
234. Id. at 32.
235. See id. at 39.
236. Id. at 23.
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., id. at 58-99.
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consensus or unexplored ideology may in fact encompass alternative values that
remain uncriticized and unaddressed because they are veiled by platitudes about
democracy and win-win solutions. When the values embedded in a policy go
unconsidered, the policy can result in failure-sometimes dramatic failure-or at
least serious fault, because there has been no admission of, nor any opportunity in
the policymaking process to account for, diverging ideologies. As the next Part
will explain, the widespread and reprehensible racism of many elected commit-
tees and elsewhere within the USDA is the most blatant and well-known problem
plaguing the farmer committee system. It is not the only problem. It may well be
that the failure to confront the various motivations described in this Part led to the
problems described in the next.
IV. FAILURES
This Part highlights a number of failings of the elected farmer committees.
This Part further argues that even if some of these failures were instead inten-
tional design features, they were certainly predictable in a system of electoral bu-
reaucracy, narrow issues, individualization, expertise, geographic diffusion, and
limited transparency. Plus, the early committee structures and operation made
too-little effort to account for these failures. The failures described here are rac-
ism and discrimination,239 poor administrative capabilities, and-perhaps as a
consequence of the first two-lack of respect within farming communities.
There is also the underlying failure of electoral design, which likely gives rise
to these other problems. The underlying problem is that elections are not an artic-
ulate way to gather public input for administrative action. The confusion grows
when we consider that adding electoral guidance to administrative action is not
novel. Only the direct connection between elections and administration is new.
Administrators are already beholden to congressional direction and presidential
oversight. Elections animate both. When administrators appear to additionally
have independent electoral authority, they answer not only to the two political
branches of government, but also to their own electorate. The first problem here
is the legal one. Creating independent electoral authority necessarily diminishes
the administrators' constitutionally indispensable connections to Congress and
the President. Practically, administrative elections add a third manager, the
administrative electorate, to the already crowded supervisory c-suite. This inco-
herent structure is likely part of the reason the other important failures have
occurred.
A. RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION
As far as my research could uncover, there have only ever been two works in
the legal literature that give more than passing mention to farmer committees.
Written nearly a half-century apart, both focus on the most obvious and most
239. Of course, if the purpose of creating the committee system was to promote and entrench a racist
social hierarchy, then the existence of widespread racism cannot fairly be called failure. However, it was
a social failure even if it was a design feature not a design flaw.
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reprehensible failure of the farmer committee systems: widespread, race-based
discrimination.240 This section will discuss each piece in turn, as well as the key
documents on which each relied.
An unsigned2 4 1 Columbia Law Review note from 1967 describes the "whole-
sale exclusion of Negroes from the processes of government," and uses the
farmer-committee system as a key example.24 2 Among the elected farmer com-
mittees in the Southeast, agricultural governance was "under virtually all-white
control-even where the people it affect[ed] [we]re mostly Negro."243 The Note
continues, "The exclusion of Negroes from the ... program mean[t] that deci-
sions which can cause economic disaster for small Negro farmers [were] commit-
ted to rural southern whites."244 As long as social paradigms remained racially
abusive, the racial impact of an electoral system was "inevitable."24 5
This 1967 note draws much of its critique from federal reports created earlier
in the decade.2 46 In 1962, an independent-study committee conducted a review of
the farmer-committee system for the Secretary of Agriculture.247 The majority of
the study committee issued a favorable overall review of the farmer committee
system, but did identify what it called "unwholesome situations" in the local elec-
toral administrative program.248 Although the majority of the Study Committee
did not clearly articulate the nature of the "unwholesome situations," a single
committee member wrote a dissenting report hat shed more light on what, in
hindsight at least, was an obvious problem. In his minority report, Morton
Grodzins wrote: "The very fact of intimate acquaintanceship with and participa-
tion in the local community may lead not to even-handed justice but to subser-
vience to the powerful and neglect of the weak."249 Parenthetically, Grodzins
240. See generally Havard, supra note 12 (discussing racism of elected committees); Agricultural
Stabilization and the Negro, supra note 12 (same).
241. I was curious about who might have written this piece, but Columbia Law Review's policy at
that time was that all notes were unsigned. I was in contact with several staff editors and senior editors of
the 1967 volume of the Columbia Law Review, and none could recall which of their classmates wrote
this piece. However, one suggested that i might have been the work of the late Robert Cover who was
indeed on the Review that year and later became a professor known for his work on racial justice.
Despite my excitement over having discovered a missing piece of Professor Cover's canon, research
help from librarian Julian Aiken at Yale Law School suggests that Professor Cover was not the author
because Aiken definitively identified Professor Cover as the author of another unsigned note (also on
racial justice) published that same year.
242. Agricultural Stabilization and the Negro, supra note 12, at 1121.
243. Id.
244. Id. In several quotes, including this one, I have removed the reference to the Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) or replaced a reference to ASCS with "elected
committees" in order to avoid confusion. The ASCS was home to the elected committees until the ASCS
merged into the FSA in 1994. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. Rather than flip between
USDA denominations, I am making an effort at more generalized consistency throughout this Article.
245. Agricultural Stabilization and the Negro, supra note 12, at 1121.
246. Id. at 1122-23.
247. See generally 1962 REVIEW, supra note 122 (evaluating the farmer-committee system and
recommending improvements).
248. Id. at 5.
249. Id. at 46-F-G.
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added, "It is worth noting that in all the county committees of the South there has
never been, as far as I can discover, a single Negro member."25 0
In 1965, the United States Commission on Civil Rights pursued this thinking
more aggressively and issued a report on civil rights within the farm programs.2 51
Although that report has broad coverage of USDA programs, a full section is
dedicated to the elected farmer committees.25 2 Drawing heavily on Grodzins'
1962 minority report, the Commission points out that between electoral politics
that marginalized black farmers and an economic system that isolated black peo-
ple and limited them to subservient agriculture roles, the meaningful participation
of black people in the committee system was of "paramount importance if the ...
committee system is to function properly."25 3 This statement is more damning
than it first seems. It powerfully indicates that the electoral system of 1965 was
not, in fact, functioning properly. In 1964, only 75 out of 37,000 elected commit-
tee members in the South were black.254 And 75 was a substantial improvement
from earlier years thanks to "intensive activity by the Mississippi Summer
Project of the Council of Federated Organizations," which sought to empower
black voters and candidates and to overcome widespread and substantial hurdles
to participation.255 The final results of this voter-and candidate-empowerment
effort might have been even larger had white farmers, landowners, and police
officers not arrested and assaulted some of the black farmers attempting to vote
and others attempting to observe the elections.256
Discrimination extended beyond the electoral process itself. The 1965 Civil
Rights Report describes, as one example, the way elected committees distributed
federal benefits.257 Recall that for some crops, farmers had to receive a federal
allotment before they could grow and market that crop.258 For a variety of reasons,
a farmer may have ultimately grown a less-than-full allotment, in which case the
remainder of the allotment went back to the elected farmer committee for redis-
tribution.2 59 This redistribution heavily favored white farmers in two respects.
First, white farmers were more likely to request redistributed allotments, possibly
because they understood that the committees were apt to grant such a request.260
Second, when black farmers did request redistributions, the committees granted
250. Id. at 46-G.
251. See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 121 (evaluating selected programs
and recommending corrective action).
252. See id. at 91-97.
253. See id. at 92.
254. Id.
255. See id.; see generally DANIEL, supra note 97 (documenting the absence of black farmers on
elected farmer committees).
256. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 121, at 92.
257. Id. at 93-96.
258. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
259. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 121, at 93-94; DANIEL, supra note 97, at 31.
260. DANIEL, supra note 97, at 32-33.
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smaller allotments to black farmers than white farmers.261 Key here is that the
committees are able to discriminate both in the actual administration of the pro-
grams and in subtler ways, such as failing to share information with all farm pro-
gram participants.262 The Civil Rights Report thus concluded, "The virtual
exclusion of Negroes ... poses one of the most serious problems with which the
Department of Agriculture should be concerned, particularly because this exclu-
sion is compounded by the discriminatory operation of the county committee
elections."263
All of this racial injustice prompted the author of the Columbia Law Review
note to urge Congress to do away with the elected farmer committee system all
together.26 4 "If the [electoral committee] system survives in its present form, it
can only hinder the advance of human rights and racial harmony in the South and
in the nation as a whole."2 65 The author offered a range of tools to mitigate the
discrimination, but ultimately concluded that there was "no adequate protection
against [the committee system's] abuse."26 6 Over a half-century later, this is still
the response of many black farmers and farm advocates when they discuss the
elected committee system.267 In an interview on the broader subject of racism
within the USDA, at least one farmer has proposed a parallel committee system
to exclusively serve black farmers.268 This strategy, however, certainly faces
a variety of challenges of its own, not least of which is questionable
constitutionality.269
The second law journal work to address the subject of elected farmer commit-
tees and racial discrimination was published in 2001, but given the still-mounting
evidence of racial injustice in the electoral system, rather than reporting on pro-
gress in the wake of the 1965 Civil Rights Report and the powerful case that the
1967 note made against the electoral system, this twenty-first-century criticism
renewed the same concerns.2 70 Professor Cassandra Jones Havard focused her cri-
tique on the role of elected committees in distributing federal-loan dollars at the
local level. The first sentences of her article neatly summarize the problem she
was trying to tackle: The USDA "loan qualification scheme allows locally elected
farmers-who, with few exceptions, are white-to make substantive decisions
261. Id. at 45. This was in part because white farmers tended to request larger allotments, likely for
the same reasons they were more likely to make a request in the first place. Id. at 87.
262. See, e.g., id. at 32.
263. U.S. COMM'N ON CivIL RIGHTS, supra note 121, at 96.
264. Agricultural Stabilization and the Negro, supra note 12, at 1136.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See E-mail Interview with Nathan Rosenberg, Visiting Scholar, Food Law & Policy Clinic,
Harvard Law Sch. (June 7, 2019) (drawing on Rosenberg's extensive interviews with black farmers over
the past several years). Rosenberg did not specifically survey farmers about the committees but reports a
majority negative response among those farmers who mentioned the committees on their own initiative.
Id. Unpublished transcripts of those interviews are on file with Rosenberg. Id.
268. Id.
269. See infra Part V.
270. See generally Havard, supra note 12 (discussing racism of elected committees).
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regarding an applicant farmer's creditworthiness. For many African-American
farmers, this structure has resulted in a sustained lack of access to USDA's low-
cost funds and, eventually, to land loss.",271
Like the 1967 note, Professor Havard had two critical new revelations and
resources upon which her critique could draw. In 1997, the USDA Civil Rights
Action Team (CRAT) painted a picture of widespread discrimination in the
USDA, little improved, if at all, since the 1960s, with the elected farmer commit-
tees central to the problem.272 In 1999, a federal judge of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia approved a settlement between the USDA and a class
of black farmers who suffered USDA discrimination over more than a decade.273
Although the order approving the settlement only barely mentions the role of
elected committees,274 the lawsuit and settlement made national news and
brought renewed attention to the issue of discrimination in agriculture.275
The CRAT Report from 1997 illustrated "a county committee system that shuts
out minorities and operates for the favored few." 2 76 The inherent problems with
the elected-farmer-committee system had not notably changed since the earlier
indictments, but the 1997 Report completely reversed course from the 1960s era
assessments in a critical way. Where the 1962 Report alleged that discretion and
independence from D.C. was a key to success of the farmer committees,27 7 in
1997, the "wide-ranging and relatively autonomous local delivery structure" was
a source of unmanaged, perhaps unmanageable, injustice.278 Elected committees
are responsive to their electors rather than leadership in Washington, D.C. Thus,
the local committees "tend to be influenced by the values of their local commun-
ities . . . rather than by standard policies promulgated at the national level." 2 79
This structure undermines any effort at an institutional failsafe. Elected farmers
are (too-) often compelled to racial discrimination by their communities, and
D.C.'s efforts to curb discrimination are rebuffed because D.C. has little effective
authority over administrators who are independently legitimated by local elec-
tions rather than by centralized appointment and oversight. The CRAT team
therefore recommended that Congress establish more centralized control over the
elected committees and, at the same time, remove certain authority, such as
authority over loan eligibility determinations.28 0
271. Id. at 333.
272. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION TEAM, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (1997) [hereinafter CRAT REPORT] (reporting results, findings,
and conclusions of an audit of civil rights issues facing the USDA).
273. Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 113 (D.D.C. 1999).
274. See id. at 86-87.
275. See, e.g., Havard, supra note 12, at 333 & n.2 (quoting from Pigford in the epigraph).
276. CRAT REPORT, supra note 272, at 7.
277. 1962 REVIEW, supra note 122, at 65-66.
278. See CRAT REPORT, supra note 272, at 14.
279. Id. at 18.
280. Id. at 64.
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Professor Havard incorporated the CRAT recommendation into her own work.
If committees are to make loan determinations, they should be made up of
experts, she argued, not interested farmers.28 1 As experts, they should be more ac-
countable to central review, but that safeguard only provides real safety if the
central review itself is fair and careful,28 2 which has not been the case for much of
USDA's history.283
Historian Pete Daniel wrote the most extensive critique of the racial animus
and race-based economic warfare that has occurred within the elected farmer
committees since their inception. Daniel's book, Dispossession: Discrimination
Against African American Farmers in the Age of Civil Rights, tells story after
story of racial injustice in both the administration of farm programs and the com-
mittee elections themselves.28 4 His treatment focuses on reform efforts in the
1960s, but he is quick to point out that these problems were not unique to that pe-
riod and continued through 2013, the time of his writing.285 Even as Congress and
USDA have paid more attention to racism and discrimination within the farm
programs, the problems have not stopped.
B. INEXPERT ADMINISTRATION
The second notable failure of the elected farmer committees is their inability to
effectively administer the vast and important programs over which they have
authority. One of the enduring justifications for the administrative state is, after
all, expertise.286 Though limiting participation on farmer committees to farmers
assures some knowledge of the industry, it does not assure expertise in the details
of administering farm programs.2 87 Probably more important, by lodging author-
ity in electors, the farmer-committee structure is by design leaning on popularity
as a first priority, not expertise. This analysis is evident in a number of critical
reviews over the last eighty years.
Professor Frischknecht, the economist and former USDA lawyer mentioned
above, praised the farmer committees in many respects, but complained that they
could not deliver the best administration.288 Alluding to the contemporary expec-
tation of expert federal administration, Professor Frischknecht wrote that the
farmer committee is "an administrative body which structurally defies the funda-
mental rules of public administration. "289 But his primary concern was not with
the electoral structure, it was with the nonprofessional nature of the committees.
281. Havard, supra note 12, at 344.
282. See id. at 338.
283. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 86-87 (D.D.C. 1999).
284. See generally DANIEL, supra note 97 (chronicling the systematic mistreatment of black farmers).
285. Id. at xi-xiii, 1-5.
286. E.g., LANDIS, supra note 2, at 23-24.
287. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The
Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2015) (explaining the distinction
between professional expertise, which is typical administrative expertise such as in law or economics,
and craft expertise, which is expertise learned on the job).
288. Frischknecht, supra note 10, at 713.
289. Id. at 716.
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He argued that a multi-headed body made up of farmers who are busy with their
own farms simply does not have the focus or time to oversee day-to-day adminis-
trative business.2 90 Committee members may be great farmers, he xplained, but
that does not make them great administrators.291
The 1962 Study Committee, which otherwise praised the farmer committees,
was most critical in its assessment of committee expertise. The key problem of
the county committees was their capability, and the first priority of the study
team's report was that the elected committees' "competence for administration
should be more firmly secured."292 To do this, the study group wanted to see the
USDA "attract the most competent and responsible men to serve on . . . commit-
tees and to equip them for imaginative and thoughtful administration of farm pro-
grams" because "[t]here is a great unevenness in the quality of men who have
been attracted to serve on the community and county committees."293 The study
team here, unlike Professor Frischknecht, thought the inadequacy of the members
was more clearly tied to the electoral process because most farmers did not exer-
cise their right to vote, so the few who did vote ended up electing unqualified
individuals.294 Were more farmers to vote, the quality of service might have
improved.295
But the problem ran deeper. A few candidates and committee members ought
office because they opposed the USDA farm programs and thought that holding a
position on the county committee would allow them to undermine or otherwise
work against those programs.296 The purpose of elections, after all, is at least in
part to provide a forum for electors to decide between competing ideological nd
policy visions. Nevertheless, the Study Committee thought hose who challenged
the existence of farm programs were manipulating or exploiting rather than fairly
employing the electoral system and recommended that the USDA only permit
those sympathetic to farm programs to be on the ballot.2 97 That would surely
make administration more effective insofar as it would make the average admin-
istrator more enthusiastic and dedicated, but in so doing it would directly under-
mine the ideal of a majority-based electoral system that-one presumes-should
not a priori take account of ideology.298
290. See id. at 713.
291. See id.
292. 1962 REVEW, supra note 122, at 5.
293. Id. at 5-6.
294. See id. at 6, 20.
295. See id.
296. Id. at 17-18. At the time the USDA raised this concern, there were no statutory conditions for
committee membership. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text. Therefore, candidates who
opposed farm programs apparently did not need to receive USDA benefits in order to participate in the
electoral process.
297. 1962 REVEW, supra note 122, at 18.
298. There is a majoritarian paradox here because one might argue that a strong majoritarian system
would allow a present-elected majority to change the electoral scheme, not only substantive law, thereby
assuring a continued majority. That would undermine the value of achieving an electoral majority but
would be difficult to prohibit in a majoritarian framework that links legitimacy to majority preference. If
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In a similar vein, the 1962 report also flagged that committee members were
not able to "acquire adequate knowledge about the programs and apply this
knowledge in administering them."2 99 To remedy this problem, the report team
suggested longer terms in office.300 This may have been a minor quibble, but the
consequence of longer terms is fewer elections-fewer opportunities for voters to
have their say-effectively more expertise at the expense of majoritarian influ-
ence. Thus, on at least two counts, though the Study Committee praised the sys-
tem, their criticisms were aimed at features inherent in elections and their
proposals would have dampened electoral vigor.
But the Study Committee was probably right in identifying scarce administra-
tive expertise among the committees. Indicative of these struggles is a series of
lawsuits over the past several decades that resulted from committee misunder-
standings, omissions, and other errors. From this trove came cases where commit-
tees apparently failed to verify claimed loss amounts,301 never responded to
applications for federal program support,302 misunderstood the legal importance
of an appeal that overturned their own adjudicatory decision,303 and, most
remarkably, refused to conform to orders of a supervisory body within the
USDA.30 4 In each instance, the errors betray nothing about farming savvy but
much about lack of managerial capability.
C. DISINTEREST
The final important failure of the elected committees has been farmers'
resounding lack of interest in them. With farmers as the only people eligible to
serve on the committees and the only eligible voters, disinterest in farm commit-
tees poses a sharp problem. From mid-century reviews to today, there has simply
been little awareness of or excitement about the elected farmer committees.
Today, there are farmers and farmer advocates who are unaware or only vaguely
aware that the committee system even exists; even when they are aware of the
committees, they tend to underestimate committee authority.305 It seems this has
long been the case.306 But more fundamental for the functioning of the commit-
tees, there has been little interest in serving on the committees and attendant low
turnout for committee elections. The 1962 Report found that in 1961, the median
voter turnout in elections was only nine percent, making increasing turnout one
the majority prefers a different electoral process, o be it. Of course, the constitutional system in the
United States would never let this come to pass, right?
299. 1962 REVIEW, supra note 122, at 18.
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., Hixson v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 15-cv-02061-RBJ, 2017 WL 2544637, at *1 (D.
Colo. June 13, 2017).
302. See, e.g., Moralez v. Vilsack, No. 1:16-cv-00282-AWI-BAM, 2017 WL 4652730, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 17, 2017).
303. See, e.g., Lucio v. Yeutter, 798 F. Supp. 39,44-45 (D.D.C. 1992).
304. See, e.g., Gross v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 1085, 1086 (D.S.D. 1981), vacated in part, 676
F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1982).
305. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Cara Fraver, supra note 33.
306. See Youngberg, supra note 209, at 164.
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of the key goals of the study team.307 The average (including elections allowing
mail-in votes and polling places) was somewhere near twenty-three percent in
that same year, with one county having a turnout of just 4.8 percent.308
Things have not improved. The most recent data is from the 2014 election
cycle, in which only 9.3 percent of eligible voters turned out.309 In the years for
which data is available, 2002-2014,310 the highest turnout occurred in 2006, at fif-
teen percent.3 1 1 This disinterest is not only a symptom, it is a flaw in the promise
of electoral administration. Administrative issues may often be too esoteric or
technical to arouse widespread interest among candidates or voters.3 12 In a search
for democratic legitimacy, asking for majoritarian input about an issue that is not
on the radar of voters may do more to undermine legitimacy by empowering
small blocs with heightened interest compared to the larger public. 3 1 3
D. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO ELECTORAL FAILURES
The critiques and data from inside and outside the USDA are enough to dem-
onstrate the clear failure of the electoral system when it comes to racial justice
and effective administration. Although the USDA has been hesitant to explicitly
point the finger at the electoral structure itself, two statutory changes are case in
point that elected bureaucrats with wide discretion cannot appropriately adminis-
ter the federal farm programs. Both of these statutory instructions are described
in Part II, but are reiterated here in the context of how they were responsive to
particular failings of the electoral structure.
The first change proves the problem of inexpert administration. In 1994,
Congress authorized a wholesale restructuring of the USDA.314 Central to the
reform was the creation of a National Appeals Division (NAD).315 NAD estab-
lished a formal, quasi-judicial, centralized, and politically-insulated process
through which aggrieved farmers can seek review of farmer committee decisions
307. 1962 REVIEW, supra note 122, at 19-20.
308. Id. at 46-D. One report claims that in some counties, the total number of elected members
actually exceeded the total number of voters. Id. at 46-D-E. Though it is not entirely clear how this
could have happened, it may be that the only voters were also slated candidates and not even all the
candidates voted.
309. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, 2014 FARM SERVICE AGENCY COUNTY
COMMITTEE ELECTION REPORT (2014), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/
NewsRoom/County-Committee-Elections/pdf/election-results/2014_electionresults.pdf [https://perma.
cc/MU6J-XL8N].
310. County Committee Elections, supra note 32.
311. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, NATIONAL BALLOTS CAST (2006), https://www.
fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/NewsRoom/County-Committee-Elections/pdf/election-
results/2006electionresults.pdf [https://perma.cc/EWW3-EDHK].
312. See Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 107, 170 (2018) ("The more specific and narrow any agency's work becomes, the harder it
becomes for watchdogs to monitor it and to sustain collective interest in it.").
313. See OLSON, supra note 203, at 12 (discussing the power of lobbies); see generally Galperin,
supra note * (discussing constitutional implications of elected committees).
314. Malasky & Penn, supra note 94, at 1165.
315. KELLEY, supra note 60, at 1; Malasky & Penn, supra note 94, at 1165.
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(as well as decisions from elsewhere in USDA).3 16 Although, strictly speaking,
this does nothing to strip the elected committees of their power, it does limit the
impact of their power by funneling decisions through a system that looks much
like a traditional administrative review process and little like the decentralized
electoral system of the farmer committees.317 In the same vein, the USDA's regu-
lations describing the structure and functions of the farmer committees are
explicit that the Farm Service Agency Administrator in Washington, D.C. retains
authority to reverse or modify any action, or to force action, from the elected
committees.318 The NAD and the central oversight evident in the regulations both
signal enhancement of central, expert, popularly-insulated administration over
the dispersed, overtly corporate-populist, and often inexpert farmer committees.
The second statutory change, likewise discussed briefly in Part II, was
cemented in 2002 when Congress dramatically reformed the election process and
set up the system that now governs committee elections.319 In addition to the pro-
nounced electoral framework for the farmer committees, there are also provisions
to assure equal access and transparency of elections, along with the possibility of
secretarial appointment of one member to represent otherwise underrepresented
farmers.3 20 Like the creation of NAD, the new process is not nominally an attack
on the elected committees; at first blush it is quite the opposite-a reaffirmation
of elections. Still, the 2002 amendments recognize the failures of the committees
with respect to race and attempt to build a framework that takes power out of the
hands of the dominant farming elites by making elections more equitable, forcing
oversight, and including nondiscrimination as a mandatory, transparent commit-
ment in all electoral communications.321 Appended to the electoral reform is the
opportunity for the Secretary to appoint an unelected member to speak for the
interests of otherwise underrepresented farmers.322 This strategy, again, does not
explicitly challenge the electoral system, but it admits a central failing of elec-
toral administration and attempts to remedy that failing by increasing authority in
the presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed Secretary.323
That the changes were an implicit insult to the majoritarian electoral system
was not lost on critics. When the USDA issued proposed election guidelines in
2005 pursuant to the 2002 amendments, the vast majority of commenters
316. KELLEY, supra note 60, at 1-2.
317. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 336-39 (1976) (surveying the administrative
review process used in Social Security Disability Insurance proceedings, beginning with widespread
decisionmaking and funneling through successive levels of federal review).
318. 7 C.F.R. § 7.1(d) (2019).
319. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 10708(b), 116 Stat.
134, 522-25 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b) (2012)).
320. 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(aa) (2012), (b)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(cc), (b)(5)(B)(iii)(VII)(cc).
321. See, e.g., § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(II).
322. See § 590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(VII)(cc).
323. See 7 U.S.C. § 2202 (2012).
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objected to the new rules.324 Most of these commenters specifically objected to
the secretarial appointment of minority representatives.32 5
The failures of the electoral farmer administration system are real, and though
Congress and the USDA have marginally changed the system to address the most
glaring problems-racism, incompetence (or limited competence), and anemic
participation-there seems to be too much investment in the symbol of electoral
administration to do away with the system. Even though they are maintained for
mainly symbolic reasons, elected administrators' very existence raises serious
questions. Thus, the next Part looks more closely at some of the lessons of elec-
toral administration with respect to administrative and constitutional law.
V. LESSONS
Any system branded as "administrative democracy" has a rhetorical appeal,
but electoral administration is not something to strive for. There are no doubt
other critiques, but here I focus on two critiques and one fatal flaw. First, as a
means to integrate the public into administration, elections are both inarticulate
and, in practice, too narrow. Second, elections give rise to obvious, undesirable
majoritarian consequences and, unlike a constitutional system that checks raw
majoritarianism, the administrative system has limited tools for that job. Third,
and related to the previous lesson, electoral administration is intentionally iso-
lated from the President, and under constitutional-appointment and removal doc-
trine, is therefore unconstitutional.
As described earlier, elections are undoubtedly a way to inject public participa-
tion into administration, but for public participation to be meaningful, individuals
must understand their special role and what they are voting for. Susan Rose-
Ackerman and Lena Riemer recently wrote that the system of public participation
in administrative decisionmaking in the United States is comparatively strong but
still does not sufficiently "seek to elicit public input and articulate how it will feed
into the ultimate policy choice."326 A charitable interpretation of the elected com-
mittees would fulfill the first prong of Rose-Ackerman and Reimer's charge: elec-
tions "seek to elicit public input" in a way that is far more assertive than the
Administrative Procedure Act's framework for public comment327 or judicial
324. Uniform Guidelines for Conducting Farm Service Agency County Committee Elections, 70
Fed. Reg. 2,837, 2,837 (Jan. 18, 2005).
325. See id.
326. Susan Rose-Ackerman & Lena Riemer, Strengthening Democracy Through Public
Participation in Policymaking: The EU, Germany, and the United States, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE
& COMMENT (May 6, 2019), http://yalejreg.com/nc/strengthening-democracy-through-public-participation-
in-policymaking-the-eu-germany-and-the-united-states-by-susan-rose-ackerman-lena-riemer/ [https://perma.
cc/8AB6-UUHV].
327. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (requiring opportunity for public comment, but not for proactive
outreach).
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review.3 28 But elections fail the second prong. Elections do not articulate how
public input will feed into the ultimate policy choice, and they further undermine
this second prong because they muddy the role of public input. The existence of
administrative elections does not determine the meaning of a vote. A vote might
tell the elected bureaucrat o pursue a certain policy, but what if that policy is con-
trary to congressional authorization or presidential discretion? Surely an elected
administrator is not free to depart from congressional or presidential authority,
but the opportunity to vote sends exactly this message. Thus, administrative elec-
tions are both unconstitutional and misleading to voters. A narrow interpretation
of electoral administration could recommend that a voter only vote for the most
technically or managerially competent candidate, but is the voter qualified to
make that choice and would the voter have any sense that the vote was con-
strained to only that judgment?
The various failures of the elected committees are not random; they are pre-
dictable consequences in an electoral system. This is not a challenge to elections
generally, but o cabined, esoteric elections without the countervailing safeguards
that the Constitution otherwise provides. Surely nobody is surprised to learn that
in a local election that deals with ownership, government payments, and local ec-
onomics, racism plays a central role. There is a good argument that racism was a
central motivation in the first place. Relatedly, elections are not an ideal mecha-
nism for selecting the most qualified technocrats. Congress and the President are
charged with exercising political will, but county committees and bureaucrats are
tasked primarily with implementation. Of course, administration in the United
States includes policy decisions, but those decisions are constrained, and the cen-
tral role of administrators is to manifest the political will of others. Elections do
not select for that skill. 3 29 Finally, because the role of administrators is to hustle
through the details of earlier political decisions, elections are unlikely to spark
the interest of qualified candidates or voters.
The final problem, which is not determined by but is certainly copacetic with
the prior, is that an electoral administrative system is unconstitutional.3 30
Constitutional appointment and removal doctrines apply where an administrator
328. See id. § 702 ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.").
329. Of course, as has been well documented elsewhere, the constitutional appointments process
provides no promise of qualified bureaucrats, see, for example, Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive
Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 467, 484 (2011), or bureaucrats who will
carry out congressional direction, see Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative
Proceedings, 81 YALE. L.J. 359, 381 (1972). See generally Andrew Kent, Congress and the
Independence of Federal Law Enforcement, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1927 (2019) (discussing degrees of
presidential control over law enforcement agencies). Nevertheless, it is arguable that the principal
officers or presidents who typically appoint administrators have more incentive and are better positioned
than others to select more qualified bureaucrats. See THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
330. I work out this argument in much greater detail in another article. See generally Galperin, supra
note * (arguing that elected committees are unconstitutional).
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is an "Officer" under the Appointments Clause.331 An officer is an official who
holds a "continuing office established by law" and has significant statutory
authority.332 In Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Supreme
Court determined that administrative law judges of the Securities and Exchange
Commission are constitutional officers because they fill statutory roles and are
empowered with "significant discretion."33 3 Congress has permanently estab-
lished the elected farmer committees and endowed them with wide and discre-
tionary powers to, for instance, adjudicate disputes much like the Securities and
Exchange Commission's administrative law judges, and to make legislative-type
policy determinations related to county-wide applicability of farm programs.33 4
As constitutional officers, committee members must be appointed in conform-
ance with one of the prefabricated constitutional mechanisms. The Constitution
provides that the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, must
appoint a principal officer.33 5 The President alone, the heads of departments, or
judges may appoint inferior officers.336 Regardless of whether the committee
members are principal or inferior officers, electoral appointment is not an avail-
able option. On appointment grounds alone, the elected committees, and probably
any bona fide electoral administration, are unconstitutional.
Removal doctrine is more difficult, and its application to the farmer commit-
tees more complicated, but an administrative electoral scheme seems to falter
under these constitutional limits as well. In broad strokes, the Court allows
Congress to create constitutional offices and then insulate those offices from
direct presidential control, but the Court does not allow Congress to insulate
officers to such a degree that the President is "stripped" of power and unable to
"hold[] his subordinates accountable for their conduct."33 7 The provisions that
govern the elected farmer committees reserve removal to the electorate only.
The President, Secretary of the USDA, and lower-level appointees such as the
Deputy Administrator for the Farm Service Agency have no ability to remove
committee members, despite USDA regulations purporting to establish a for-
cause removal process.3 38 Without removal authority lodged in the presidential
chain of command, electoral committees are unconstitutional. Careful drafting
could avoid this removal problem by lodging some removal powers in political
supervisors.3 3 9
331. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
332. 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2052 (2018).
333. Id. at 2053 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878).
334. See supra Section II.B.
335. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
336. Id.
337. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,496 (2010).
338. Galperin, supra note * (manuscript at 27-29) (arguing that the statute provides only for electoral
appointment, Congress's silence on removal implies only electoral removal, and that the USDA
regulations are not authorized by the limited statutory grant of rulemaking authority).
339. Id.
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Presuming Congress could also solve the appointment problems, shifting re-
moval authority might steel a system of administrative elections against constitu-
tional failures, but it would weaken the electoral design in equal measure. Every
quantity of authority added to the central bureaucracy is subtracted from the local
electors. Allowing "Washington bureaucrats" to overrule local voters has merit,
but is orthogonal to the first arguments for elected administrators.
The lessons of electoral administration need not convince us that electoral
administration is untenable, but they should force us to confront problems that
are not evident in the superficial promises of electoral accountability.
CONCLUSION
The life of administrative democracy-if "democracy" is even an appropriate
moniker-is represented by just one experiment within the USDA about which
few seem aware. The USDA Farm Service Agency is home to over 7,700 elected
administrators who sit on over 2,200 county committees and administer aspects
of the vast and diverse federal farm programs. These administrators make regular
adjudicatory decisions that decide the legal rights and obligations of individual
farmers, and they set area-wide policy that applies to all participating farmers
within their jurisdiction. They are elected, they are administrative, and they are
almost entirely unknown outside of the USDA even though they represent a re-
markable anomaly in the federal administrative structure.
The death of administrative democracy, of electoral administration, has not
yet arrived, but if and when it does, bureaucratic elections probably will not be
missed. Or rather, the USDA's elected farmer committees probably will not be
missed. Champions of administrative democracy could point to a number of
justifications for the endeavor. The farmer committees were born, in part, out
of the ideal of Jeffersonian rural empowerment, which is not unique to farm
governance, but does not extend to all possible forms of administrative democ-
racy. More broadly, administrative democracy may fulfill goals of deliberative
democracy and civic republicanism, which are more vital at the local level.
Elections actively invite civic participation. But the zero-sum nature of
elections also dampens continued deliberation and ongoing participation.
Pluralism that turns governmental decisionmaking over to interest groups is
one feature of administrative democracy that could work, but in the case of
USDA committees there is no competition because the elected committees are
not pluralistic, but corporatist, empowering only a single industry to self-gov-
ern. The area in which the elected committees have most notably met early
expectations is their ability to entrench social, predominantly racist, hierar-
chies. The committees were created in part to help wealthy, mostly white, agri-
cultural landlords maintain control in industry and communities. Decades of
elected committees in which elections, information, and money were con-
trolled by local elites have proven that electoral administration, despite its
sense of egalitarian voting, can effectively demean and repress. Failure to meet
the high hopes of most of these philosophical motivations-and the bitter irony
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that the greatest success was in the most shameful goal-will blunt much grief
at the passing of electoral administration.
Though its life has not been much celebrated, upon its death, condolences for
the concept of administrative democracy may be more plentiful. The word "de-
mocracy" is powerful. It evokes accountability, equality, and control. Given the
frequent pleas for more accountability, equality, and control in the federal bu-
reaucracy, it is possible that some observers will still see elected bureaucrats as a
viable option. But accountability, equality, and control, if even possible, would
come at the expense of other constitutional promises, such as the promise of
Congressional and Presidential power over administrators and the promise of
non-majoritarian democratic engagement. Each of these unfulfilled promises
could conceivably exist in other attempts at electoral administration. Surely, the
story of the USDA's elected farmer committees i an anecdote, not the story of
the administrative state more broadly. Though the lessons reach beyond farm pol-
icy, it is unclear how far exactly they do reach. But it is clear that we should take
the lessons seriously.
Elected farmer committees have not fulfilled their role as both representatives
and administrators. The committees cannot thrive as administrators because elec-
tions do not advantage experts, do not excite voters, and are most likely to favor
regulated industry. The committees cannot effectively represent their voters
because they are constrained by constitutional demands to obey the limits of their
congressional authorization and the direction of presidential oversight. If the
Supreme Court were ever to hear a challenge to the USDA's elected committees,
they would doubtless find flaws in the mode of appointment by voters not by the
President, a head of department, or courts of law. They would also surely find
flaws in a system that restricts executive removal authority and places that author-
ity instead in the hands of voters.
The allure of "democracy" may keep this USDA experiment on life support,
but the legality of the system will not survive. From a policy perspective, the loss
will not be so great. From a scholarly perspective, it is just a shame that the life of
administrative democracy has been so little remarked on.
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